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Chapter 2 
 
Made in Brazil:  
Industrial Competitiveness Ten Years after Economic Liberalisation* 
 
João Carlos Ferraz, David Kupfer and Mariana Iootty 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In 1996, we published, in Portuguese, with Lia Haguenauer, the book “Made in Brazil: competitive 
challenges for the industry” (Ed. Campus). This was a major work where, departing from an analytical 
framework we developed at the Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, we 
analysed a massive amount of original data and articles produced by a large number of sectoral specialists, 
in a major research project, co-ordinated our partners from UNICAMP, headed by Prof. Luciano Coutinho, 
and us. This was an analysis of the competitiveness of the Brazilian industry in the turn of the decade. 
Made in Brazil had a major impact on specialised circles because of its wideness and thoroughness.  
Since then we have been willing to follow the lead of the 1996 book, to further improve the analytical 
framework and to update the analysis of competitiveness. Now we have an unique chance to get close to 
our wishes, but relying, once more, on a major research co-ordinated in 2001/2 by our partner, Luciano 
Coutinho, and produced for the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and International Trade 
(MDIC), with funding from FINEP, an agency from the Brazilian Science and Technology Ministry.  
Sectoral reports for the project “Estudo da Competitividade de Cadeias Integradas no Brasil”  were 
used, once again, as the basic input for the present analysis. We used data and information on sectoral 
reports to provide our interpretation on the competitive changes in the Brazilian industry, between 1990 
and 2003. The following sectors were analysed: in the commodity industrial group, steel, pulp and paper 
and citrus; in durable, consumer electronics and automotive; in traditional industries, shoe and textile and 
garments, in innovation carriers: mechanical engineering capital goods, telequipment and the computer 
industry. 1 
During this period the Brazilian economy went through a major institutional change: rules governing 
relations among economic agents changed in tow respects. First, and structurally most important, economic 
liberalisation is the central feature of the national regime of incentives and regulations. Secondly, price 
stabilisation has been, as never before, a major target of macroeconomic policies. To what extent 
institutional changes implied corresponding structural changes in industry? Are competitive pressures 
greater? The relative importance among industrial groups has changed? New activities emerged? Which 
ones cease to exist? Are firms more competitive? Which ones? Are they relying on those competences –i.e. 
innovation capabilities- that are widely known as conforming the basis for sustained or expanded market 
shares? 
These are the questions guiding us in this article. In the first section we will update the 19996 discussion 
on patterns of competition and competitiveness. It will be seen that we still rely, strongly, on the very same 
analytical framework. Still, we believe that around the space of competition is where the dynamics of the 
                                            
* This article is dedicated to our late partner, Lia Haguenauer. We will always miss her companionship, 
professionalism and personal integrity. Our writings will never again be so sharp and clear. 
1 We must thank Achyles Barcelos da Costa, Fábio Erber, Fernando Sarti, Germano Mendes de Paula, José Rubens 
Dória Porto, Márcia Azanha Ferraz Dias de  Moraes, Marcos Fava Neves, Maria Graça Derengowsky Fonseca, 
Matheus Kfouri Marino, Mauro Thury de Vieira Sá, Rafael Oliva, Roberto Vermulm, Victor Prochnik for producing such 
a high quality material. 
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capitalist machine is fully revealed. The second section provides an account of the most important 
institutional changes and an aggregate overview of the industry’s evolution between 1990 and the early 
2000s. Following from there the next four sections analyse competitiveness in each of the four industrial 
groups of the early 1990s: commodities, durable goods industries, traditional industries and innovation 
carriers industries. The last section provides an overall balance, indicating commonalities and differences 
among them. 
2. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS: PATTERNS OF COMPETITON AS A TOOL FOR 
ANALYZING COMPETITIVENESS  
2.1. ON THE NOTION OF COMPETITIVENESS 
Traditional analysis of competitiveness can be classified into macro and micro approaches. The macro 
approach focuses on allocative efficiency: if an economy has the right prices, it would automatically 
produce the correct investment, leading to best advantageous specialisation. From a microeconomic 
approach, competitiveness is associated to technical efficiency: the adoption of best practices implies 
adequate productivity levels, which are automatically transferred into better market shares. As argued by 
Haguenauer (1989), these approaches are not sufficient; they assume automatic transmission mechanisms 
and lack of information failures, which are seldom found in the daily operations of businesses.  
Market shares are conquered as a result of a productive performance that incorporates efficiency in product 
and process developments. These, in turn, are derived from accumulated resources mobilised by past 
strategic decisions. These are based on anticipating demand expansion and other economic expectations as 
well as similar actions taken by competitors. Thus, to overcome the weaknesses of traditional approaches 
while, at the same time, drawing on specific contributions that are valuable, such as the notion of 
efficiency and market shares, it is necessary to develop an approach closer to what is known as structural 
approach, where competitiveness is perceived as an interactive process between firm, industry and macro 
determinants. (Kupfer, 1993) 
In this text, competitive firms are those capable of formulating and implementing strategies leading to 
sustained or expanded market position in the segment of industry where it operates. A couple of remarks 
on this basic definition are necessary. 
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish different aggregation levels of analysis. Competitiveness must be 
defined at firm level, referring to specific markets, which could be associated to segments of industries. A 
firm is competitive if its strategies, capabilities and performance are coherent with the critical factors of 
success in the activity it operates. Nonetheless, it is necessary to emphasise the notion of the space of 
competition. If the competitive process is fully revealed in specific markets, the aggregation proxy for 
segments of industrial sectors is formed by a set of firms operating in similar markets. This group of firms 
conforms an industrial segment and standardised sectoral industrial classifications aggregate them in a 
number of segments or sub-sectors. By aggregation, in a given moment of time, it is possible to consider a 
sector competitive if the majority of its production is derived from competitive firms, operating in the 
sector’s various segments. At this level firms are aggregated by market similarity.  
Secondly, competitiveness must be viewed as a dynamic concept in a double dimension. In the first 
dimension, competitiveness is related to a firm’s accumulated capacity, in itself a dynamic notion, since 
present capacity results from past strategic decisions on where financial resources should have been 
allocated. The ex-post performance of a firm – higher or lower market-share – reveals whether past 
strategies and capacities were competitively adequate or not. Thus present market position does not 
necessarily ensure future competitiveness. The second dimension is related to changing market conditions, 
derived from strategies adopted by other firms that cause changes in relevant competitive drivers in that 
industry. This consideration leads to another central concept – patterns of competition or a set of 
competitive drivers. Competitiveness stems out of the adequacy of individual firms’ strategies to the 
specific drivers prevailing in each market. 
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2.2. PATTERNS OF COMPETITION 
Patterns of competition are defined as the collection of key factors (drivers) required for competitive 
success in each industry. Given the large number of possible intervening drivers, it is necessary to organise 
them under some type of criteria. A simple and operational criteria is one in which factors are organised 
according to the capacity of a single firm to influence their direction and evolution.  
Thus, a collection of determinant factors, representing the results of its past and present strategies, lay 
within the boundaries of the firm (internal factors), where it has complete control. Another collection of 
factors is industry specific (structural factors). They have equal importance to firms operating in similar 
market segments. In general, individual firms have only limited and indirect control over structural factors. 
Finally, there is a collection of drivers (macro factors) that are associated to the political and economic 
environment of a country and placed well beyond the influences of individual firms. Thus, a competitive 
process has a systemic character, determined not only by individual firm’s efforts, but also by the nature of 
the industry in which it operates and by economic/institutional aspects. 
Internal factors refer to decisions, accumulated capacities and performance in the areas of management 
(entrepreneurship, strategic planning, finance), sales efforts (marketing), production (equipment and 
process technologies, organisational techniques, quality management), and innovation (product and 
process innovation, technology flows). In all these areas human resources are essential, requiring skills 
corresponding to specific functions. Firms must be efficient in most areas to be competitive but, in 
different patterns of competition, necessary skills, competences and specific drivers, critical for 
competitiveness, may differ. 
Structural factors are those that shape competition rules and conditions under which every firm has to 
operate, within the same industrial segment. They can be divided into three categories: market and demand, 
industrial configuration and regimes of incentives and regulation. As in the case of internal factors, 
different industries define different competitive drivers at the structural level. 
Demand/market drivers can be described according to volume and growth rates of demand; access to 
national and international markets; geographical and income descriptors of a market; price, quality, 
technological level and other attributes of products. Generically, growing markets and diversified 
consumer requirements in terms of price, quality, sophistication, technology and other attributes allow for 
greater market segmentation and lower tolerance against less competitive products.  
An industrial configuration can be described in terms of technical and firm level economies of scale and 
scope; technological trajectories of products and processes; access conditions to equipment, inputs, 
services and technology, including the nature of relations between firms, clients and suppliers, services and 
infrastructure. Again, generically, an industrial configuration may contribute to competitiveness if size of 
firms and productive integration are sufficiently high, where horizontal and vertical clusters abound and 
where the available infrastructure and services allow for minimum external down time. 
The regime of incentives and regulation defines specific institutional rules under which firms of a certain 
industry must operate. Incentives are those associated with lowering the cost of investments and running 
production (credit, taxes, fiscal incentives, etc). Regulations are related to rules that define for economic 
agents the degree of freedom of operations, including legislation on property consumer, environment, 
competition, etc. Generically a pro-competitive regime induces high levels of rivalry among competitors 
and is capable of lowering capital costs to levels similar to those prevailing in other markets. 
The third level where competitive drivers are located refers to framework conditions. They can be divided 
into: 
- political-institutional: political stability, institutional development; 
- economic: exchange, interest and wage; tax and tariff policies, supply of credit, and other 
variables related to overall performance of the economy; 
- infrastructure: availability, quality and cost of energy, transport, telecommunications, 
- social: education and vocational training system, social security; 
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- international: capital, technology and trade flows. 
Economic and institutional determinants of investment and production are a sine qua non condition of 
competitiveness; they define the contours within which firms are able to compete in markets for goods, 
services and capital. The potential competitiveness of a country’s firms relies on its macroeconomic 
performance, on its institutional framework, on its insertion into international trade and finance, on the 
availability of adequate human resources.  
Successful economies have combined a certain degree of openness with policies that are conducive to 
investment, macroeconomic stability and strong institutional arrangements. Stability facilitates the 
emergence of clusters of capabilities that are necessary to bring about coherence and consistency of pro-
competitive actions by the private sector, in the long run. Likewise, competitive economies are likely to be 
those where public authorities have implemented a whole set of policies not only well but also 
simultaneously.  
When the macroeconomic environment is unstable, usually firms and institutions follow adaptive strategies 
not conducive to competitiveness and sustained development. Unstable paths of fundamental 
macroeconomic variables, as for instance, low investment during long periods of time, influence the 
structure of production through the election of activities, technologies and assets by firms, operating in 
condition of limited valuation of economic risk and low capital efficiency. In such context, considerations 
about industrial linkages, technological opportunities, organisational practices and the introduction of new 
products and processes are left behind due to the burden of short-term economic instability and the 
unpredictability of future economic policies.  
2.3. DEFINING PATTERNs OF COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVE DRIVERS 
The analysis of competition requires the identification of competitive drivers in different market segments. 
Porter (1980), drawing on classical industrial organisation literature proposes two generic business 
strategies –cost and differentiation- with two other corresponding strategies for more focused business 
orientations. Drawing on the literature on industrial organisation and market structures, and on empirical 
evaluation undertaken in Brazil, it is possible to suggest the existence of four different orientations for 
competitive strategies, each associated with specific sources of advantages, at the level of the firm and the 
industrial structure.  
Firms can be successful by offering: (i) cost advantages, (ii) product differentiation, (iii) responsiveness or, 
(iv) technologically sophisticated products. Very few firms can achieve excellence, simultaneously, in 
every source of competitive advantage. Competitive firms are those that focus and develop coherent 
strategies, capabilities and performance on the relevant factors concerning the pattern of competition that 
prevails in the specific industry they intend to operate. 
As shown in Table 1, as firms focus specific strategies, they are bound to develop and rely on 
corresponding sources of competitive strategies.2 
Price/cost competition is typically the case of standard commodity market segments. Since these 
commodities are intrinsically undifferentiated, competitive firms are those which manage to have low unit 
costs and high production volume, ensuring production efficiency, mainly by operating capital intensive 
plants that yield high economies of scale, as well as developing efficient logistics systems, thus reducing 
inputs and distribution costs. 
Product differentiation can be achieved by technology, quality, price and marketing activities. It requires a 
wide span of capacities and resources. Most advanced firms try to concentrate in design and marketing 
functions while production is extensively sub-contracted. Thus the mobilisation and supervision of partners 
is an essential source of competitive advantage.  
Responsiveness is a strategy strongly associated with production flexibility. Firms target market niches 
aiming at specific consumers, stratified by income, age, peculiar interests, customs, etc. Others direct their 
                                            
2 Macro determinants, being generic, were not considered in this classification, although it is possible to suggest that 
the impact of macro determinants is differentiated by sectors. 
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efforts toward delivery, taking advantage of their proximity to clients and/or suppliers and adopting 
techniques like quick response. Capacity requirements are less strict than in other patterns, but it is 
important to have management and supervisory skills, as well as product quality levels acceptable to a 
particular market niche. 
Innovation is the source of competitiveness in technologically sophisticated market segments, like 
precision instruments or aeronautical equipment. Firms must have strong technological capacities, highly 
skilled R&D technicians and access to updated science and technology laboratories. 
In summary, a pattern of competition arises from competitive rivalry, from efforts by competing firms. 
Once a pattern of competition and competitive drivers are established as standards, strategies of all firms 
must follow suit. In most industries a very finite or only one pattern of competition prevail. However, 
where geography and income differences abound or in industries where families of similar products may 
co-exist, firms pursuing different patterns of competition can survive and prosper.  
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TABLE 1 
PATTERNS OF COMPETITION: STRATEGIES AND SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGES 
COMMODITIES  
(COST STRATEGY) 
DURÁBLES  
(DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY) 
TRADITIONALS 
(RESPONSIVENESS STRATEGY) 
INNOVATION CARRIERS 
(INNOVATION STRATEGY) 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
MANAGEMENT process control organisational flexibility workers and entrepreneurial skills R&D-production-marketing integration 
PRODUCTION mass flow & energy efficiency assembly and supply-chain co-ordination 
capabilities 
quality control design for manufacturing 
SALES access to distribution channels brand image market information market creation & business to business 
marketing  
INNOVATION process technology product & components design embodied technology, learning by doing R&D + design 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 standardisation segmentation by quality and marketing segmentation by levels of income & type 
of product 
segmentation by technical needs 
MARKET price, technical conformity price, brand, technological content, 
technical assistance 
price, brand, delivery times, customer 
orientation 
attendance to client specifications 
 access to international trade regional & global trade local & international trade local & regional trade 
 plant level economies of scale firm and plant level economies of scale 
& scope 
economies of agglomeration and 
networking 
economies of specialisation 
CONFIGURATION OF INDUSTRY access to raw materials & transport 
logistics 
articulation assembler-supplier, 
distribution 
horizontal & vertical networks interaction with users  
 specialised technical services metrology & standardisation 
metrology, standardisation, certification 
& accreditation; market & technical 
information; training 
science & technology systems 
 anti-dumping & commercial policy property rights anti-dumping intellectual property rights 
REGIME OF REGULATION 
AND  
environmental protection consumer legislation competition & consumer policies selective protection 
INCENTIVES cost of capital consumer credit support for SME risk support 
  fiscal incentives tax system credit for users 
    state purchasing power 
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3. 10 YEARS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
3.1. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE MAIN INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: THE BRAZILIAN INDUSTRY UNDER 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION PRESSURE 
The 1980s were a period of great technological advance on the industrialised countries in general, and on 
the newly industrialised countries (NICs) in South East Asia in particular. Inversely, during the same 
period the Brazilian industry underwent significant tensions due to the macroeconomic instability and the 
institutional transition derived from the exhaustion of the import substitution model as the basic reference 
for its national development. As a result, the technological gap, once reduced by the catch-up of the 1970’s, 
was again expanded. Although the Brazilian industry survived the lost decade, maintaining a complete and 
integrated industrial structure, by the end of 80s it presented significant deficiencies in terms of process 
and product technologies, and production organisation. 
In the 1990s, the global context was delineated by a strong competition between firms and countries, by 
the commercial and cross-borders capital flows, and by the diffusion of new technologies, specially 
information technologies. The USA and Europe have both consolidated the liberalisation process of their 
foreign exchange policy and financial sector regulation, thereby enhancing the capital mobility between 
different economies. 
In Brazil, the first years of the 1990s were a period depicted by two consecutive shocks on the competitive 
context – the economic liberalisation in 1990 and the monetary stabilisation resulted from the Real Plan in 
1994. The subsequent changes were induced by structural reforms on the external sector, the international 
financial sector integration, and the state owned firms which implied the development of new growth 
strategies from the leading firms, and by a redefinition of the inter and intra relationship between those 
firms and the State. 
The most relevant microeconomic features of these reforms were: (i) the economic deregulating process, 
which included the exclusion of price control mechanisms for goods and services and the removal of 
“protected market zones” and other regulatory requirements for investments in Brazil; ii) the trade and 
financial liberalisation process, trough the reduction of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers and the deregulation 
of the foreign capital flows; iii) the privatisation process, in order to redefine the State role in the economy. 
The Brazilian privatisation process had a double bottom line, the national industry modernisation, and the 
reduction of the fiscal debts. 
The commercial liberalisation process of the 1990s was surely the most consistent of all the economic and 
institutional policies promoted in Brazil since the 1980s. Following a significant tariff reduction schedule, 
the mean value of the nominal tariff was diminished from 32,2% (with interval 0-105% and standard 
deviation of 19,5) to 14,9% (with interval 0-40% and standard deviation of 10,7) in July 1993 (Kume, 
1996). 
Although not so widely discussed, the measures concerning the patrimonial structure were also important 
to define a new institutional regime. The main target of these measures was to equalise the rules of the 
game between foreign and national firms, thereby stimulating the inflow of foreign capital. As a 
counterpart, it was expected that the foreign capital would increase the competitive pressure on the national 
scenario, and would ease the access to new technologies and open new investment financing sources. 
Among the measures that equalised the rules between foreign and locally owned firms, the most 
outstanding are: extinction, in 1991, of the restrictions to the foreign firms entry in the technologies of 
information sector; elimination, in October 1993, on the imposed limits to the foreign capital participation 
in the privatisation process; elimination, by a constitutional emend of 1994, of the established legal 
differentiation between national and foreign firms, that made possible the access to official credit agencies, 
subsidies and incentives to foreign firms; exemption of income tax for profit and dividends remittances by 
the foreign affiliates in the country; elimination, decided by Congress vote in 1995, of several restrictions  
to industrial property, mainly the prohibition of patents registration of drugs and biotechnology based 
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products; extinction by an act, of the prohibition in remitting royalties payment for brands and patents in 
multinational firms; removal, by the constitutional reform of 1995, of the sector restrictions to the foreign 
capital participation in the services sector (more notably in the financial sector), extractive activities (end 
of the State monopoly over petroleum) and telecommunications; and financial liberalisation that created 
more favourable conditions for the transnational firms established in the country, eliminating the 
restrictions to the use of national financial system and thus access to the BNDES funding. 
The macroeconomic changes were intimately associated with the monetary reform issued by the Real Plan 
in 1994 and also with the subsequent return of capital inflows. The Real Plan successfully decreased the 
inflation spiral3, and promoted a significant increase of demand due to the growth of real wages and the 
renascence of consumption-credit of durable goods. On the other hand, the return of capital inflows was 
important to cover current account deficits and to finance fixed capital investment. The overvaluation of 
the national currency during the 1994-1999 period was a natural consequence, which was pushed even 
further by a set of specific policies defined by the Central Bank to reinforce it. 
In fact, with the Real Plan in 1994, a new phase in the industry path began. Appreciated exchange rate and 
high interest rates, the two pillars of the macroeconomic stabilisation plan, together with bringing forward 
the end of the initial schedule of the tariff reduction to December 1994 and the adoption of the Mercosur 
External Tariff were the main characteristics of the new competitive environment established in the 
country. In practice, these measures are responsible to the deepening of the international exposure of the 
Brazilian industry, where began the effective openness of the economy, that continue up to the exchange 
rate devaluation in the early 1999. The impacts of the local currency evaluation and tariff reduction after 
the Plano Real exacerbate the competition with the imported goods, resulting in a rapid deterioration of the 
trade balance, in deficit from 1995. The resume of the external capital influx permitted the financing of the 
trade deficit, however, of short breath regarding the risk of vulnerability of the external accounts. The 
current trade maintained its expansion until 1997, where suffers a sudden reverse, indicating that the 
competitive regime implemented during this period become exhausted.  
This internal and external environment posed new challenges to Brazil: the need to preserve the solvency 
of the financial system and to maintain sound macroeconomic foundations. During the 1990s, the Brazilian 
economy faced a positive net capital inflow, of unprecedented magnitude, which was extremely dependent 
on a particular set of favourable external circumstances. As a result, the foreign expenditure and the current 
account deficits increased to levels not compatible with macroeconomic stability. Actually, the abundant 
entry of financial resources exerted negative effects on monetary supply and on exchange rates. Exports 
were affected; imports expanded significantly and Brazilian economy became very vulnerable to possible 
changes in the international context. Therefore, the government was forced to sterilise the monetary effects 
of foreign capital, by increasing interest rates. Consequently, the counter face of external financial 
dependence was revealed not only in a weak growth of expansion-related investments, but also in an 
insufficient GDP growth during all the 1990s. 
In this context, the next section analyse the Brazilian industry performance in the 1990s, focusing on four 
main dimensions: industrial production and employment; productive and ownership structures; external 
trade pattern; and fixed capital and R&D investments strategies.  
 
3.2. THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION AND DEREGULATION DURING THE 90’S 
 
3.2.1. More production with less workers 
In the 1980s, the employment level experienced fluctuations following the path of erratic production level 
changes. However, from the beginning of the 1990s, the productions and employment series start to follow 
opposite trends. The Figure 1 shows a clear divergence between these series, particularly after 1993.  
                                            
3 Inflation rates decreased from more than 1000% in 1993 to 20% in 1995 and 5% in 1997. 
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FIGURE 1  
OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT IN BRAZILIAN MANUFACTUTING INDUSTRY, 1985-1999 
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Source: IBGE – Monthly Industrial Survey and Monthly Employment Survey 
 
Many economists, as Gonzaga (1996), identify the beginning of the 1990s as a structural break point on the 
relation between production level and employment. Today, this interpretation is well accepted, but this 
subject was vastly debated after 1991. For authors as Gonzaga (1996), Amadeo and Soares (1996), Bonelli 
(1996), the clear divergence between product and employment series in the 90s could be regarded as 
evidence that significant technological changes – in production process and/or in production organisation – 
were carried out. This explanation tries to shed light on the microeconomic transformations developed 
inside the firms. The commercial liberalisation and the economic deregulation would have bring about new 
parameters on decision process of firms which was trying to achieve productive efficiency. 
Other authors, such as Silva et alli (1994), sustained the interpretation that there was no evidence that the 
economy was coming through a general structural adjustment. For these analysts, the economy was simply 
facing a recessive adjustment. 
It is important to remark that a significant part of the satisfactory performance of production must not be 
taken as a clear effect of a modernisation process, but as a statistical effect concerning the data, which was 
based on series of production value, not on ideal series of value added4. 
Nevertheless, though there was not a consensual interpretation among the analysts on this point, all of them 
have recognised a clear trend of productivity growth, at least in the beginning of the 1990s. The growth of 
the industrial production level in 1993 was followed by an acceleration of productivity indexes. This 
productivity performance was regarded as a clear indication that a fast and general modernisation process 
                                            
4 About the difficulties to compute productivity data in this period see, for instance, Salm, Sabóia and Carvalho 
(1997) or Amadeo and Soares (1996) 
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was being developed. At a first sight, it was these new facts, not new analysis that have finished the debate. 
 
3.2.2. The same productive structure but with different owners 
Several studies (e.g. Kupfer, 1998) conclude that no important change had ocuured in the sector 
distribution of the industrial production during the 1990s. Considering all production activities, the 
participation of the industrial sector to the GDP remained unchanged from 1991 to 2001 (Table 2). The 
manufacturing industry, after the initial expansion during the first phase of the trade openness (until 1993) 
started a fast falling trajectory just after 1994, when the effects of the Real appreciation due to Real Plan 
deepened the degree of the real openness of the Brazilian economy. 
 
TABLE 2 
GDP STRUCTURAL COMPOSITION, 1991 A 2001, SELECTED YEARS, (%) 
Sector 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Agriculture 7,8 7,7 7,6 9,9 9,0 8,3 8,0 8,2 8,2 7,7 8,0
Industry 36,2 38,7 41,6 40,0 36,7 34,7 35,2 34,6 35,6 37,5 35,8
Manufacturing 24,9 26,4 29,0 26,8 23,9 21,5 21,6 21,0 21,5 22,5 21,1
Services 56,0 53,6 50,8 50,1 54,3 57,0 56,8 57,1 56,2 55,0 56,2
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,1 100,3 100,0
Source: IBGE/DECNA 
 
From the data on the evolution of the different industrial groups output, showed in Table 3, can be 
evaluated the differences in the intra-industrial dynamics. Industrial commodities, durable goods industries, 
and food and beverages were the sectors that revealed a superior evolution to the mean of industry, and 
agricultural commodities, traditional industries except food/beverages and innovation carriers industries 
maintained almost the same production level through 1991 to 2000. 
 
TABLE 3  
INDEX NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT (1991 = 100), 1991 A 2000 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Industrial Commodities  100,0 99,7 103,7 109,5 109,6 115,9 122,8 126,8 130,3 138,2 
Agriculture Commodities  100,0 101,9 98,4 94,4 97,2 100,6 104,0 101,2 105,4 98,9 
Traditional industry except 
Food/beverages 100,0 93,4 101,4 105,3 104,8 103,6 104,1 101,3 100,0 104,3 
Food/beverages 100,0 95,7 98,9 107,2 121,6 127,0 127,3 128,9 128,9 130,5 
Innovation Carriers 100,0 94,7 102,0 123,3 120,0 107,8 105,2 105,6 98,3 108,2 
Durable Goods 100,0 89,8 115,2 133,0 147,6 153,4 165,8 133,9 123,1 148,6 
Manufacturing Industry 100,0 96,3 103,5 111,4 113,4 115,4 119,9 117,4 116,7 124,2 
Source: IBGE - Industrial Monthly Survey (Special Tabulation) 
 
Contrary to sector distribution, the composition of the firms’ revenue per capital origin suffered a deep 
transformation in the period under analysis. According to Rocha and Kupfer (2002), in a study with the 
300 biggest Brazilian firms (in liquid revenue), the market-share of the leading state owned, multinational 
and private national firms evolve during the 1990s, as follows: 
· State owned firms – reduce the participation from 44.6 per cent in 1991 to 24.3% in 1999, 
where the major part of that fall (15.2 per cent) occurred between 1991 and 1996 and a minor 
part (5.3 per cent) between 1996 and 1999. 
· Multinationals - grew its participation from 14.8 per cent to 36.4 per cent between 1991 and 
1999, homogeneously through the two periods (11.6 and 10 per cent, respectively). 
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· Private nationals – maintained the share without big changes between 1991 and 1999 (40.6 and 
39.3 per cent respectively) albeit the small share increase of 3.5 per cent between 1991 and 
1996 and a little higher through 1996 to 1999 (4.8 per cent). 
 
Data suggests that changes in the ownership structure of the leading firms occurred in a two phase process.  
During first phase, corresponding to 1991-1996 period, there was transference of the revenues of the state 
owned firms to the private firms, independently from their nationality. This was the of privatisation phase. 
In the second phase, corresponding to 1996-1999 period, occurred revenue transference from national 
firms, independently if they were private or public run, to multinational firms. This was the 
denationalisation phase. 
The analysis of the mergers and acquisitions processes and of the role of the foreign capital investments 
and the privatisation permit a better understanding of the extension of the changes that occurred during the 
decade. 
Operations involving changes in the corporate control of firms increased through this period. According to 
KPMG Consulting, 2353 M&A transactions occurred between 1991 and 2000, where ¾ were concentrated 
after 1996. A significant part of these transactions, especially concerning the values involved, was 
associated to the selling of state owned firms. According to BNDES, the revenues from the privatisation 
process surpassed US$100 billions from the beginning of 1991 through 2002, 2/3 of which were federal 
government run firms and the rest state run firms. In the first phase of the privatisation process (1991-
1995) the steelworks, mining and petrochemical sectors were exceptionally relevant and later the electrical 
power, finance services and telecommunications sectors. The last sector was, alone, responsible for US$ 30 
billions in government revenues. 
At the same time, inward foreign direct investments, that were minimal since the late 1980s, assist to an 
exponential growth from 1995 to 2000, as a result of a higher international liquidity and of the country 
attractiveness just after the stabilisation of the economy. A considerable part of this capital was re-directed 
to the acquisition of state owned assets, as shown in Table 4. Figure 2 shows the same trend. From 1996 on, 
the privatisation program had a new role with the entering of multinational firms, being responsible for an 
increase of the share of the take in operations.  
 
 
TABLE 4 
FLOW OF EXTERNAL CAPITAL FOR PRIVATISATION AND OTHER USES 
 Inflow 
Year Privatisation Others Total 
Outflow Net Flow 
1995 ... 5.475 5.475 1.237 4.238
1996 2.645 7.851 10.496 603 9.893
1997 5.249 13.512 18.761 1.944 16.817
1998 6.121 22.359 28.480 3.002 25.478
1999 8.786 22.586 31.372 1.389 29.983
2000 6.677 26.726 33.403 3.387 30.016
2001 1.079 20.193 21.272 2.328 18.944
Source: BNDES (www.bndes.gov.br) 
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FIGURE 2 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, PRIVATIZATION, AND SHARE OF EXTERNAL DIRECT INVESTMENT –
US$ MILLIONS AND % 
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Source: Sieffert Filho and Silva (1999) and KPMG in Diniz and Boschi (2001) 
 
As a result of the privatisation program implemented by the Brazilian government in early 1990s, 
particularly for the commodities industry, there was a significant change of ownership of the leading firms. 
According to Rocha and Kupfer (2002), state owned firms, responsible for 42 per cent of the 1991 
revenues, decreased their participation to 22.6 per cent in 1996, that is from the twelve state owned firms 
remained only Petrobras. This decline was followed by an increase of the share of the national firms that 
from 36.5 per cent share in the revenues were responsible for almost half of the total revenues for 1996. 
However, this share was not sustained after 1996. At the same time, is interesting to see that multinational 
firms move forward in the commodities production arriving to 1999 with a market share very close to that 
of national firms.  
During the 1990s we assist to a confirmation of the considerable role of foreign capital to the industry 
responsible for technological diffusion. Multinational firms, that controlled 60 per cent of the total revenue 
in 1991, continue to growth its importance and achieved 86 per cent market share by 1999. National firms 
suffered a reverse tendency decreasing its participation from 40 per cent in 1991 to 13.1 per cent in 1999, 
revealing loss of competitiveness. State owned firms, through Embraer were responsible for a mere 1 per 
cent to total revenues in 1991, left this market completely.  
Also in the traditional industry, the multinational firms grew its role, from half of the national firms’ 
revenues in 1991 to achieving almost the same market share by the end of the decade. 
As final statement, the observed pattern of changes suggests that the loss of competitiveness of national 
firms started in the period 1996-1999. Contrary some analysts’ arguments, this was truth for the whole 
industry and not only for technologically intensive industries. In this period, we assist to transference of the 
activities of the leading national firms to infra-structure services activities. Certainly, the privatisation of 
that sector opened a new space and opportunities for those firms exit industrial activities.  
 
3.2.3. Regressive specialisation trend in the trade pattern 
The external insertion of the Brazilian economy during the 1990s was characterised by a raise in the exports 
and imports. The imports rose faster than the exports provoking a reduction in the trade balance. Figure 3, 
shows the evolution of exports, imports, trade balance and trade flow for Brazil from 1980 to 2002, and 
permits to clearly verify the effects of the different competitive regimes on the trade balance, during the 1990s. 
Between 1990 and 1993 the trade flow and the trade balance remained unchanged. This behaviour suggests 
that the tariff reform had had small impact in the international insertion of the industry (Kupfer, 1998). 
Immediately after the Real Plan in 1994, as has been said, went together with an acute overvaluation of the 
Real, comes into our attention the raise of the trade flow due to the rapid expansion of the imports. As the 
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exports rose at moderate levels, most of the times at a lower level than the world exports, the imports 
duplicate from 1993 to 1995 (or triplicate from 1990 to 1997). As result the trade balance deteriorate to deficit 
levels by 1995, after 14 years of superavit results, being in the red by US$ 8.2 billions in 1997. Only after the 
predictable exchange rate crisis in January 1999, that result in a depreciation of the Real and the return to a 
fluctuate exchange rate system, started the reversion of this trade balance deficit. However, the trade flow 
remained stable, suggesting that the openness of the trade system achieve its limits. 
 
FIGURE 3 
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRADE: 1980-2002* 
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* Annualised from data until october/2002 
Source: Alice Database 
 
The changes in the external insertion of the industry were shown in different dimensions. First the increase of 
the Mercosul participation in the trade flow, but only until 1998. Table 5 shows the destination of the exports 
and the origin of the Brazilian imports for selected years during the 1990s. The growth of Mercosul role in the 
share of Brazilian exports is due to: (i) a certain diversification of export markets with the reduction of the EU 
weight in the exports and inversely (ii) a concentration of the imports from US and EU. 
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TABLE 5 
DESTINATION AND SOURCE OF BRAZILIAN EXTERNAL TRADE  
1990-2002 – SELECTED YEARS –% 
 Exports Destiny Imports Source 
 USA Mercosul EU Japan Others USA Mercosul EU Japan Others 
1990 24,6 4,2 32,5 7,5 31,2 20,4 11,2 22,6 7,2 38,7 
1993 20,7 14,0 26,4 6,0 32,9 20,4 13,4 23,5 7,6 35,0 
1996 19,5 15,3 26,9 6,4 31,9 22,4 15,6 26,7 5,2 30,1 
1998 19,3 17,4 28,8 4,3 30,2 23,7 16,3 29,2 5,7 25,1 
1999 22,6 14,1 28,6 4,6 30,1 24,1 13,6 30,5 5,2 26,5 
2000 24,3 14,0 26,8 4,5 30,4 23,3 14,0 25,2 5,3 32,2 
2001 24,7 10,9 25,5 3,4 35,4 23,5 12,6 26,7 5,5 31,7 
2002 25,7 5,5 25,0 3,5 40,3 22,1 11,9 27,7 5,0 33,3 
Source: Alice Database 
 
Also, there was a divergent tendency in the evolution of the mix of export and import goods. From the 
exports side (Table 6) between 1990 and 2000 we can see a small reduction on the participation of basic 
products (e.g. iron, soya flour, row coffee beans, triturated soya and tobacco leaves) and semi-manufacture 
products (e.g. pulp, row steel, row aluminium, soya oil, iron steel, crystal sugar) and to an increase of the 
manufactured products. After 2000, there was a reverse in this tendency, returning to the 1990 values. 
From the imports side (Table 7) there was a consistent increase of the intermediary products participation, 
as a consequence of natural adjustment in the productive processes (subcontracting, outsourcing) 
implemented by the a large number of firms almost in all industrial sectors. Regarding the other imported 
items, the weight of imports oscillated cyclically. The contraction of participation in the consumption 
goods in the imports share after 1999 reflects the change in the exchange rate regime.  
 
TABLE 6  
COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS  
1990-2002 – SELECTED YEARS - % 
 1990 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Basic Goods 27,8 24,3 24,9 25,4 24,6 22,8 26,4 28,1 
Semi-manufacture Goods 16,3 14,1 18 15,9 16,6 15,4 14,2 14,8 
Manufacture Goods 54,2 60,8 55,3 57,5 56,9 59,0 56,5 54,7 
Source: Alice Database 
 
TABLE 7 
COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS  
1994-2001 – SELECTED YEARS - % 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Intermmediate Goods 41,2 45,0 46,1 43,5 46,4 48,8 51,0 49,3
Consumer Goods 16,1 21,8 18,3 18,8 18,6 15,1 13,2 12,8
Oil and  13,1 10,4 11,7 9,7 7,1 8,6 11,4 11,3
Capital Goods 29,6 22,7 23,9 27,9 27,9 27,5 24,4 26,6
Source: Alice Database 
 
A more accurate measure of the change in the pattern of international insertion of the Brazilian industry is 
the relation between trade flow and the variables associated to the country’ size, such as production output. 
Two measures are defined: exports coefficient (ratio of value of exports to gross output) and imports 
coefficient (ratio of value of imports to gross output). 
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Figure 4 shows the evolution of the exports and imports coefficients during the 1990s, for transformation 
industry. The values confirm the previous analysis. Table 8 shows both coefficients for selected sectors, 
those of more business volume. Two features claim our attention: the rapid evolution of the imports 
coefficient for those sectors of more value added and technologically more advanced, as electronic and 
electrical equipment, auto-parts and pharmaceuticals; and of the exports coefficient in those sectors of low 
added-value and low technological incorporation as shoes and leather, sugar, wood and furniture, and 
vegetal oils, however, automobiles and auto-parts are also responsible for a rapid increase of the exports 
coefficient. 
 
FIGURE 4 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY: EXPORT AND IMPORT RATIOS (%), 1990-2001 
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Note: Export Ratio – export / gross output  
Import Ratio – import / gross output  
Source: Ribeiro e Pourchet (2002)  
 
TABLE 8 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY: EXPORT AND IMPORT RATIOS (%), 1990-2001 
Industries 1990 1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Export Ratio 
Calçados, couros e peles 23,8 43,3 38,5 42,9 53,8 61,0 74,9 
Açúcar 13,8 20,1 27,1 31,2 44,0 24,1 46,0 
Peças e outros veículos 16,2 21,1 18,6 26,5 39,5 41,0 45,0 
Equipamentos eletrônicos 5,7 8,9 5,9 9,4 20,8 29,2 38,5 
Óleos vegetais 29,2 26,8 25,9 20,5 23,7 20,9 27,6 
Madeira e mobiliário 4,4 12,1 10,5 11,8 19,5 19,6 24,1 
Veículos automotores 9,3 15,8 7,2 17,2 18,5 18,9 23,1 
Import ratio 
Equipamentos eletrônicos 13,9 31,0 40,1 57,5 98,6 103,8 122,7 
Material elétrico 9,0 11,7 18,4 24,1 33,9 28,5 40,3 
Peças e outros veículos 8,9 13,7 18,9 28,5 39,2 31,6 34,5 
Farmacêutica e perfumaria 7,9 9,5 17,0 18,1 27,6 22,9 30,1 
Máquinas e tratores 11,3 12,9 26,1 31,4 36,0 23,3 28,4 
Note: Export Ratio – export / gross output  
Import Ratio – import / gross output  
Source: Ribeiro e Pourchet (2002)  
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The data presented in this section suggest that the international insertion of the Brazilian industry changed 
a lot after the post-openness period. The decisive years for this imports “explosive” trajectory were 1994 
and 1995, concurrent with the transition period and the post- Real Plan. By the end of 1998, the financing 
model of the Brazilian balance of payments become unsustainable, inaugurating a new recession phase and 
successive local currency devaluation. After 2001 the balance trade recovered and presented positive 
values, reflecting a period of moderate exports increase and a contraction on the imports. 
The depreciation of the Real occurred by the beginning of the 1999, brought expectations on a rapid 
growth returning of the Brazilian exports. However, after three years this did not occur. To some 
specialists, the feeble performance of the exports in recent years can be explained by the international 
unfavourable cycle of the prices of mining and agricultural commodities, establish in the international 
markets. To others, the explanations are less related to conjuncture factors but more with the trade 
restrictions to Brazilian products, as well issues related with the commercial policy, emphasising the 
importance of the negotiation strategies adopted by Brazil in the multilateral and regional efforts to a better 
positioning of country’ exports.   
Although the above listed causes are pertinent, some structural factors should be incorporated to the 
analysis. The exports and imports dynamics of a country depend on two conjugated effects: the 
competitiveness effect that explains part of the variation of the trade flow which is related with the change 
in the market share of a country to the total of world trade flows; and the positioning effect, that explains 
the part of the variation of the trade flow which is related to the relative share of a sector in the world trade 
flows. Kupfer (2002) calculated the contribution of these effects in the EU and US markets, the more 
relevant markets for Brazilian exports for 1995-1999. In the case of US, only a third of the exports value 
presents competitiveness and positioning positive effects. For the EU market this number decreases to only 
18 per cent. 
The 2002 US$ 10 billions trade balance was close to the values of the 1984-1987 period. Although based 
on a similar list of exported products, the imported products list was quite different, and more intensive in 
dynamic products. So the commercial reforms were not capable of changing the competitiveness of 
Brazilian industry. By the way, the relative participation of Brazil in the international trade flows 
decreased from 1.4 per cent in the mid 1980s to the current 0.7 per cent.  
 
3.2.4. Capital and R&D investment strategy are still the same:  
One of the most critical conditions to the sustainable evolution of industrial competitiveness is the 
investments in fixed capital. These investments can congregate new productive capacity, and become an 
important factor of generating economies of scale and scope and incorporation of new technologies. 
However, during the 1990s this was not the case for the Brazilian economy. The period is characterised by 
a lack of any tendency of expansion of the gross fixed capital accumulation, as we can see in Figure 5.  
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FIGURE 5  
GROSS CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN BRAZILIAN ECONOMY  
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Source: IBGE/DECNA 
Albeit this general tendency, from the mid 1990s it is possible to observe some recovery in the rates of 
investment in the Brazilian industry to the GDP, surpassing the rates of the early 1990s, that were the 
lower of the last decade, as we can see in Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9 
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT / GDP RATIO  
CONSTANT PRICES OF 1980 
1972-1980 4,5 
1981-1988 3,2 
1988-1993 2,2 
1995-1997 3,2 
Source: Bielschowsky (1998) 
 
According to Bielschowsky (1998) forecast, the yearly investment level for 1995-97 would be, in absolute 
terms, 82 per cent above the mean for 1992-93. Nevertheless, these rates are far below those registered for 
the investment peak reached in the 1970s and are closer to the values observed during the 1980s. These 
comparatively low investments can show a resume on the investments in the industry, during the 1990s. 
Bielschowsky (1998) presents a basic argument to justify the superior quality of the recent investments in 
the industry. According to a research conducted by CNI/ECLAC with 730 firms (see Table 10), the goals 
of the firms fixed investments planned and that took place during the 1990s, besides being related with the 
productive modernisation (especially concerned with costs reduction) was possible to detect an expressive 
growth of the expansion investments (particularly those related with new products launch in the market). 
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TABLE 10 
MAIN GOALS OF FIRMS’ CAPITAL INVESTMENT 1992-94, 1995-96 E 1997-98  
(% OF FIRMS BY GOAL INDICATED AS DOMINANT) 
Goal 1992-94 1995-96 1997-99 
Cost reduction 52,2 61,9 54,0 
Equipment substitution 57,3 55,2 49,0 
Unbottlenecks 30,2 43,4 32,9 
Plant expansion 33,3 41,7 47,4 
New products 27,1 39,2 57,3 
New plants 11,4 20,4 32,9 
Source: Bielschowsky (1998) 
The tendency related with the resume of the pace of investment in the industry observed in the past years, 
must be, however, better defined regarding industrial sector specificities. The industry has been having a 
different reaction to the impacts of these investments in the transformation of the competitive environment. 
The second issue to be analysed is the technological behaviour of the Brazilian firms during the 1990s. 
Even if working with aggregated data, it is possible to characterise quite precisely the local innovative 
efforts achieved by the industry (PINTEC/IBGE – Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation, 2000). 
This recent research, scrutinise the innovation efforts of the Brazilian firms as: (a) external acquisition of 
R&D and other knowledge; (b) launch of technological innovations in the market; (c) internal activities of 
R&D; (d) development of industrial projects or other technical procedures; (e) training of its members and 
(f) acquisition of machinery and equipments. 
In this enlarged view, the Brazilian firms showed an active but budding innovation effort. By the end of 
1990s, as shows Figure 6, only a third of the industrial Brazilian firms implemented some type of 
innovation. From a total of 70 thousand firms (with ten or more employees) for the period 1998-2000, 
merely 31.5 per cent implemented product and/or process innovations - 22.7 thousand firms. This 31.5 per 
cent innovation rate can be divided as: 6.3 per cent of firms only introduced product innovations, 13.9 per 
cent process innovations and 11.3 per cent both product and process innovations. 
. 
FIGURE 6 
SHARE OF INNOVATING COMPANIES IN THE TOTAL SAMPLE, 1998/2000 
 
Source: IBGE, Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation, 2000 
Figure 7 shows firms’ perception of the scale of importance of several types of innovation efforts. Clearly, 
the majority perceives innovation through acquisition of machinery and equipment as the most innovative 
activity (76.63 per cent) and through training (59.06 per cent).  The first category is associated to 
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technologies incorporated in the machinery thus, a sign of process modernisation. The second category of 
innovation efforts - training – can only be considered indirectly. Although, workers competencies improve 
by training, not all training activities end up in innovation activities. The most important fact is that a third 
of the Brazilian industrial firms consider vital the engagement in internal R&D activities. 
 
FIGURE 7 
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES EFFORTS, 1998/2000 
 
Source: IBGE, Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation, 2000 
 
Table 11 shows of what is been said. From the 72 thousands industrial firms, with total sales of R$ 582 
billions in 2003, just 19 thousand spent R$22 billions on innovation expenditures, that is 3.8 per cent of 
total income. From this value, 2 per cent was allocated to machinery and equipment by 15 thousand firms. 
In 2000, this value corresponded to R$ 11.6 billions, which is half of the innovation expenditure. As for 
R&D expenditure, merely 7.412 firms spend 0.64 per cent of its liquid income, R$ 3.7 billions. In these 
R&D activities, 31.4 thousand professionals work full time and another 32.9 thousand professionals work 
part-time. 
 
TABLE 11 
NET REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN INNOVATIVES ACTIVITIES, 2000 
Expenditure in Innovative Activities 
Total Internal R&D Activities Acquisition of Equipment 
Number of 
Firms 
Net Revenue 
(R$ 106)  
(1) Number of 
Firms 
Value 
(R$ 106) 
Number of 
Firms 
Value 
(R$ 106) 
Number of 
Firms 
Value 
(R$ 106) 
72.005 582.406,1 19.165 22.343,8 7.412 3.741,6 15. 540 11.667,3 
Source: IBGE, Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation, 2000 
 
Even among the restrict group of firms that are engaged in innovation efforts, prevail important differences. 
Table 12 clearly shows that the bigger the firm, the greater is its innovation engagement. Less than half of 
the firms that have R&D expenditures do it in a regular base. However, this group is responsible for 90 per 
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cent of national expenditure in R&D. In the same way, the bigger the firm, the bigger are its efforts in 
R&D, only 27.78 per cent of the small firms showed R&D expenditures against 79.88 per cent for firms 
with more than 500 employees. 
TABLE 12 
DISTRIBUITION OF NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EXPENDITURES IN PERMANERT AND EPISODIC R&D 
ACTIVITIES BY SIZE, 2000 
Permanent R&D  
Activities 
Episodic R&D  
Activities  Size  
(in Number of Employees) No. of Firms  
% Expenditures % 
No. of Firms  
% Expenditures % 
Total 42,87 90,04 57,13 9,96 
10 to 29 27,78 31,96 72,22 68,04 
30 to 49 31,56 53,9 68,44 46,1 
50 to 99 45,26 65,67 54,74 34,33 
100 to 249 55,31 78,47 44,69 21,53 
250 to 499 65,56 86,95 34,44 13,05 
500 or more 79,88 96,12 20,12 3,88 
 Source: IBGE, Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation, 2000 
 
The innovation efforts have been incipient and of low qualification and besides that, firms do not consider 
partnerships to increase their technological efforts intensity. Table 13 shows that only 11.04 per cent of the 
Brazilian firms co-operate with other firms. Again, the collaboration intensity increases with firm’s size: 
from 7.43 per cent of firms with 10 to 29 employees to 37.80 per cent for bigger firms. 
 
TABLE 13 
SHARE OF NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH COOPERATIVE R&D EFFORTS IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF 
INNIVATIVE FIRMS BY SIZE, 1998/2000 
Size  
(in Number of Employees) Share of Firms with Co-operative R&D Efforts (%) 
Total  11,04 
10 to 29  7,43 
30 to 49  8,78 
50 to 99  11,19 
100 to 249  16,52 
250 to 499  20,25 
500 or more 37,80 
Source: IBGE, Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation, 2000 
 
3.3. SHIFTS IN THE PATTERNS OF COMPETITION DURING DE 90’S: SOME STYLISED FACTS  
The institutional transition towards a new paradigm “lead by the market” – trade liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation - was very difficult, taking in account the low credibility of the role of 
government and absence or inappropriate use of the structural and systemic pre-conditions (technological 
and physic infra-structure, loans, etc). Probably, the most important source of uncertainty was the unknown 
effects of the open market regarding the potential of penetration of imported goods into the Brazilian 
market. The result of this uncertainty, is the loss of capacity by firms to forecast the real size for its current 
markets, leading to a reduction on the pre-existent microeconomic degree of confidence. 
The environment structurally hostile to competitive restructuration faced additional constraints due to the 
recession trend experienced in the Brazilian economy that restricted the investment decisions. It is not clear 
the extension of the openness effects in promoting an acceleration of the investments in expansion or 
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industrial modernisation. However, conjoined with the recession effects we could not expect a lot from the 
response capacity of firms.  
Looking forward, some stylised facts can be derived from the Brazilian recent institutional transition, each 
of them implying important changes in the patterns of competition of the local industry. There are: 
· Trade liberalisation in an unstable macroeconomic environment led the Brazilian industrial sector 
to a regressive specialisation, that is, the adjustment was concentrated on downsizing and out-
sourcing products and services. 
· There was a once-for-all increase in productivity indexes instead of an increase in productivity 
growth. The lack of favourable structural conditions for long-run investment in R&D and output 
expansion led to a concentration on cost-minimising strategies and mergers and acquisitions. 
· Trade liberalisation without efficient export-promoting policies resulted in structural trade deficit, 
which in its turn tended to intensify the foreign-exchange constraint on economic growth. 
· Multinational enterprises increased their market share in industrial sectors of high technological 
content. As a consequence, intra-firm trade and sub-contracting increased in importance in these 
sectors and the degree of domestic competition decreased. 
The next sections will explore this implication trough a more detailed analysis of the restructuration of 
some of the main branches of the Brazilian industrial structure. 
 
4. COMMODITIES: A DUAL TRACK STRATEGY: LOW COST FOR EXPORTS, 
DIFFERENTIATION FOR THE LOCAL MARKET 
4.1. PATTERN OF COMPETITION NOW AND THEN: WIDENING AND DEEPENING THE SEARCH FOR 
LOW COSTS 
Commodity related industries are engaged in producing intermediate inputs to industrial or final 
consumption, through large-scale production processes. The reference driver for commodity-based 
industries is cost competition. Cost minimisation strategies mattered in 1990 and are still prevalent in 2003. 
(See first two columns in Table 14) The search for and exploration minimisation drivers at company level, 
as well as in markets and industrial configurations was enhanced. This is most noticeable on regimes of 
incentives and regulations of developed nations, where markets were defended for local firms by means of 
explicit protectionist measures. 
Since commodity products are intrinsically undifferentiated, competitive firms sustain and expand access 
to all sources of low unit costs and high production volume. Production efficiency and economies of scale 
are still ensured by three different but complementary sources: high capital intensive plants, preferential 
access to inputs –raw materials and energy sources- and transport logistics. In such a context, large, multi-
plant, companies, operating internationally are capable of expanding the frontiers of low cost. During the 
last decade, simultaneously with similar operations in other sectors, more aggressive firms have deepened 
up their leadership positions, becoming larger and more internationalised by means of mergers and 
acquisitions transactions. 
At the level of the firm, core competences are still related to four sources of competitive advantages: 
knowledge to effectively manage, acquire or access process technology, inputs, transportation, product 
distribution networks and preferential clients. The diffusion of information systems based on 
microelectronics technologies has provided the technical base for co-ordinating large-scale operations and 
logistics. 
The pattern of competition among firms has remained closely associated with homogenous oligopoly; 
firms have knowledge on market perspectives and the behaviour of competing firms on a global basis. 
Thus, for competitive success, it is of fundamental importance to anticipate demand growth or to 
effectively respond to changes in price and quantity demanded from local and international markets.  
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Aggressive firms are those implementing two types of investment strategies –through green field but 
preferably M&A operations: expanding capacity ahead of demand growth of current products and 
virtualisation. Virtualisation expands the frontiers of cost minimisation, through economies of scale, and 
provides complementary sources of revenue. Revenue possibilities have expanded significantly in the past 
10 years, by means of widening product portfolio (product grading in petrochemicals), exploring 
transportation assets for third parties or selling-off energy surplus. 
The preferential access to capital markets is of vital importance for the competitiveness of investment-
driven strategies. On this matter, large and internationalised companies have considerable advantages over 
firms operating single plants or in a limited number of national markets.  
International competition in a context of liberalised national economies has strengthened a particular and 
historical trend: although prices of most commodities fluctuate along world economic cycles, relative 
prices have showed a declining trend, imposing problematic terms of trade for commodity dependent 
exporting nations.  
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TABLE 14 
Patterns of competition (POC) and competitiveness in Commodities: now and then  
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGES 
PoC COST 
RELEVANT DRIVERS 
 1990 
PoC COST 
RELEVANT DRIVERS 
2003 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 1990 
Brazilian  
COMPETITIVENESS 2002 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
MANAGEMENT Process control   Efficient More efficient 
PRODUCTION Mass flow & energy efficiency NO CHANGE Efficient Efforts placed in energy control 
SALES Access to distribution channels  Efficient More efforts 
INNOVATION Process technology  Incipient local efforts Incipient local efforts 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 Standardisation  
 
Prominence in low value added segments 
Dual track more visible: low value added 
for exports and higher value added for local 
consumption 
MARKET Price, technical conformity NO CHANGE   
 Access to international trade  Low growth of demand Cyclical with worsening terms of trade 
 
Company and plant level economies of 
scale  
Efficient plant size but low size of 
companies; prominence of SOE; low 
internationalisation efforts 
Inside trajectory with important ownership 
change, prominent role for local capital and 
State as partner; low internationalisation 
efforts 
CONFIGURATION OF INDUSTRY Access to raw materials & transport 
logistics 
NO CHANGE Good access to inputs and deficiencies in 
logistics 
More efficient 
 Specialised technical services  Reasonable efforts Reasonable efforts 
 Anti-dumping & commercial policy INCREASED IMPORTANCE  Trade restrictions Stronger pressure 
REGIME OF REGULATION 
AND  
Environmental protection INCREASED IMPORTANCE  Existing Stronger pressure 
INCENTIVES Cost of capital NO CHANGE High Still high 
   
Tax distortions 
Risk of cartelisation, infant privatisation 
Tax distortions, Cartelisation yet to come, 
privatisation completed but not 
consolidated 
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4.2. COMPETITIVENESS IN 2002: SUCCESSFUL CATCHING-UP BUT OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION 
AND PRODUCT UPGRADING MUST BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED 
Steel, pulp and paper and concentrated orange juice, among other commodity industries like soy and iron 
ore, are considered to be pillars of Brazilian international competitiveness. In these industries, in 2002, 
Brazil held a significant market share in international export markets: 80% in concentrated orange juice, 
37% in sugar, 34% in soy grains, 32% in coffee and 16% in the meat industry. In 1990, the relatively small 
size of leading companies and the low levels of product value-added were the relevant competitive 
challenges facing Brazilian commodity producers. Since then these challenges were only partially 
addressed, while other sources of competitiveness were strengthened out. (See last two columns in Table 
14)  
Companies placed considerable emphasis on actions closely associated to direct input costs like ensuring 
access to raw materials and transport infrastructure. Lowering energy costs was an important investment 
item, given its high burden on total costs and the supply crisis the country faced in 2001. Also they 
consolidated capabilities to efficiently operate technically updated plants but still relying on capital goods 
suppliers to define the technological possibilities of improving processes. 
Privatisation of the steel industry and private mergers and acquisitions have changed ownership structure 
of most industries, providing the opportunity for the emergence of larger firms. However, this process has 
not ended, meaning that market structures are still to be further consolidated. Even so, leading Brazilian 
firms, when compared to their international counterparts, have remained relatively small and oriented 
towards the local market. Leading international corporations were particularly active in acquiring 
competition and/or complementary assets in the 1990s.  
In terms of product portfolio, Brazilian firms still supply international markets predominantly with low 
value added products, although they have invested in directly accessing distribution networks and large 
clients. For the local market, however, firms have evolved towards widening and upgrading product 
portfolio. This dual track behaviour has been consolidated throughout the years. Remains to be seen 
whether the experience in the local market may prove useful for conquering new and more valuable 
segments in international markets, in the years to come. 
4.2.1. The steel industry 
In the steel industry two outstanding processes were in place: the unfolding of the privatisation process 
initiated in the late 1980s and a substantial but localised investment drive in stages of the production 
process associated with the generation of new, higher unit value products to be sold in the local market. 
Local capital prevailed in the privatisation process. Financial institutions accounted for 33.6%, pension 
funds for 15% and industrial corporations process for 21.8% of the value of privatisation transactions. Six 
large steel companies and six small ones were privatised in Brazil, for a consideration of US$ 5.7 billion. 
Due, to a great extent, to the privatisation technique – auctions – an outstanding feature of the 1990s was 
the post-privatisation ownership instability and changes.  
After privatisation was completed, 20 private M&A transactions were carried out. Between 1990 and 2000, 
only 17% of production units (measured in physical capacity) were not subject to at least one change in 
ownership. Concentration was increased in flat steel business, remembering that as USIMINAS acquired 
COSIPA, the plate segment became a virtual monopoly. The Gerdau group was the most active in 
acquiring private companies in Brazil and abroad. Throughout the 1990s it purchased 4 steel enterprises in 
Brazil and 7 abroad. It is focused on long steel business. Progressively the ownership structure of the 
industry has been consolidated, as shown in the Table 15. 
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TABLE 15 
2002 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF THE BRAZILIAN STEEL INDUSTRY 
Special Steel  Acesita Arcelor (39%), Previ (19%), Sistel (12%) 
 Villares Sidenor (58%), BNDESPAR (29%) 
 V&M V&M (93%) 
Long Barra Mansa  Votorantim (100%) 
Steel  Belgo-Mineira Arcelor (60%), Bradesco (11,5%) 
(Carbon) Met. Gerdau Gerdau (73%) 
 Açominas Gerdau (79%) 
Flat  Cosipa  Usiminas (92%) 
Steel CSN Vicunha (46,5%), Valia (10%) 
(Carbon) CST Acesita/Arcelor (44%), CVRD (20,5%), Kawasaki (20,5%) 
  Usiminas CVRD (23%), Nippon Steel (18%), Previ (15%), CIU (10%) 
Source: Paula (2002) 
 
The investment drive of the 1990s was very unexpected given the country’s macroeconomic uncertainties 
and those arising from the privatisation process. As leading firms actively engaged in fixed capital 
spending, together with the automobile industry and telecommunications equipment suppliers, the steel 
industry was an exception to the low investment context of Brazil. What is even more surprising is that the 
investment drive took place in a context of strong ownership instability that normally would prevent 
corporations from capital immobilisation. Between 1994 and 2000 average annual investment was 
US$ 1,450 billion. More important was the dual track destination of investments: large investments in 
rolling area, enabling product upgrading for the local market. On the other hand, the country’s steel exports 
became more and more dependent on semi-finished products. 
In 1999, in value terms, the world share of Brazilian production in semi-finished products was 14.1% and 
in galvanised sheets only 0.4%. The share of semi-finished in total Brazilian steel exports increased from 
39.2% in 1990 to 68.4% in 2001, in physical production or 28.6% to 47.3% in value terms, respectively. 
This expansion was attained even in a context of increasing protectionist barriers, as the case of the USA 
demonstrates. Conversely, in the local market, between 1992 and 2001 total steel consumption increased 
89% and galvanised sheets 402%. Above 50% of total demand came from the auto and civil construction 
sectors. The auto industries were responsible for 70.6% of special long steel products; the civil 
construction for 49.25 of carbon long steel products. 
The investment drive had direct impact on efficiency levels. Even though output levels remained around 25 
million tons per year, modernisation of installations and sharp cuts in employment levels – at an annual 
average of 7.6% between 1989 and 2000- resulted in corresponding sharp increases in productivity levels - 
from 11 to 5.4 man-hour per ton, between 1991 and 2000. (Figure 8) Most technologies associated with the 
investment drive was not developed in-house but incorporated in capital equipment. 
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FIGURE 8 
OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY, 1988-2001 
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Source: Paula 2002 
The strength of competitiveness in low value added products can also be found in the industry’s cost 
structure, As shown in Table 16, competitiveness of the Brazilian steel industry also relies on the low level 
of labour and iron ore costs. Financial costs and the costs of coal still constitute the basic source of 
competitive disadvantage. 
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TABLE 16 
PRODUCTION COST OF BOBINAS LAMINADAS A FRIO, SELECTED COUNTRIES, APRIL 2001 (US$ / 
DISPATCHED TONS)  
 
 
USA Japan Germany UK S. Korea China Brazil 
Raw materials 115 106 109 105 112 118 103 
Coal 27 27 26 24 28 28 37 
Iron Ore 55 56 62 58 59 75 40 
Scrap / DRI 33 26 21 23 25 15 26 
        
Other raw materials 172 150 148 153 134 152 135 
        
Labour costs 154 142 136 113 62 26 57 
Hourly wage 38 36 34 27,6 13 1,25 10,5 
        
Total operational costs 441 398 392 371 308 297 295 
        
Financial costs  39 60 40 46 42 50 67 
Depreciation 29 40 30 26 30 30 32 
Interest 10 20 10 20 12 20 35 
        
TOTAL COST  480 458 432 417 350 297 362 
* in man-hour per ton 
 Source: Paula (2002); 
 
 
4.2.2. Pulp and paper 
In 1990, competitive challenges facing the pulp and paper industry were very similar to those of the steel 
industry: lack of company level economies of scale and a product portfolio based on low value added. 
Since then the industry has evolved towards facing these competitive challenges, but at a slower rate when 
compared to its international counterparts. Thus, successful competitive catching up still require those 
challenges to be addressed to. 
Brazil produces around 7 million tons of pulp and another 7 million tons of paper. This output places the 
country as the 7th largest producer of pulp (first in short fibre pulp) and 11th in the production of paper. But 
internal consumption per capita –at 40kgs- is very low, even compared to other countries at similar levels 
of development. 
Two basic sources sustain competitiveness of the Brazilian industry: privileged and low cost access to the 
basic input – eucalyptus used for the production of short fibre pulp- and technically updated plants. 
Backward integration, towards rationalised eucalyptus forests is certainly a major source of 
competitiveness, given its important contribution to total costs and the high levels of efficiency attained in 
plantations. Industrial efficiency is particularly observed in pulp production but there has been 
considerable efforts also in increasing productivity levels of paper production. Efficiency in production has 
been accompanied by increasing levels of environmental compliance. As a result, the competitiveness of 
Brazilian products in export markets has been consolidated. However, much remains to be done in terms of 
expanding company size and updating product portfolio in the paper industry. 
Eucalyptus forests have taken up space in Brazil. In 1990, out of 64 million hectares planted, 42 were 
eucalyptus forests and 20 million pinus forests. Ten years later, the extension of pinus plantation remained 
constant while 100 million hectares of eucalyptus forests were planted. 
As shown in Table 17, in 2001, Brazilian industry leads world short fibre production, with a 19.4% share 
of total supply. Leadership has been consolidated as, in 1990, that share was 11.7%. Between 1990 and 
2001 Brazilian industry expanded at 9.5% annually, inferior only to that of Indonesia, a late comer to the 
industry. In value terms, exports increased from US$ 556 million in the beginning of the 1990s, to US$ 1.3 
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billion in 2000. 
 
TABLE 17 
WORLD SUPPLY OF SHORT FIBER PULP (IN THOUSAND/TONS) 
Country 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 share 2001 Annual 
growth 
Brazil 1,380 2,215 2,260 2,700 3,285 3,615 3,740 19.4% 9.5% 
USA 2,590 3,215 3,235 15 2,840 2,780 2,935 15.2% 1.1% 
Indonesia 90 130 250 1,220 1,850 2,150 2,915 15.1% 37.2% 
Canada 1,025 1,285 1,780 1,830 1,820 1,990 1,985 10,3% 6.2% 
Spain 735 950 885 910 940 1,040 1,050 5.4% 3.3% 
Finland 1,030 775 770 800 810 850 905 4.7% -1.2% 
Others 4,930 4,695 4,790 5,065 5,350 5,845 5,790 30.0% 1.5% 
TOTAL 11,780 13,265 13,970 12,540 16,895 18,270 19,320 100% 4.6% 
Source: Fonseca (2002) 
 
To a great extent, competitive success in pulp production relies on the capacity of companies to operate at 
low costs. Table 18 shows a picture very similar to that found in the steel industry. Compared to other 
leading pulp producers, direct production costs are very low, at US$ 302 per ton while interest rates are the 
highest, among leading producing nations. 
 
TABLE 18 
COMPARATIVE PULP PRODUCTION AND FINANCIAL COSTS (US$ TON/CIF NORTH EUROPE) 1995 
 Argentina Canada  Chile Portugal Spain Sweden USA Brazil 
Production costs 974 452 371 349 370 424 374 302 
Depreciation 40 41 56 33 21 50 40 45 
Interest 35 36 37 65 59 55 40 70 
         
Total cost  449 528 454 444 450 529 454 417 
Source: Fonseca (2002) 
 
In paper production the picture is very different both, in terms of volume of production and share of world 
markets. In 2000, Brazil produced 7,188 thousand tons of paper, while international counterparts produced 
323,295. Although in the 1990s the 4.3% annual rate of growth of Brazilian industry is higher than the rest 
of the world (3.3%), its international market share is very small and has remained unchanged - 2.0% in 
1991, 2.2% in 2000-, for all types of papers.  
Five types of papers respond to more than 50% of 2000 exports –printing/writing, non-coated paper, 
sanitary paper, cardboard e kraftliner-; ten years before this concentration was higher, at 70%. But, since 
1990, in value terms, paper exports have remained below US$ 1 billion for most years. Thus, in 2000, 62% 
of total paper production was sold in the local market; 22% represented self consumption of the producer 
and only 15% was exported. 
According to the trade association, Bracelpa, 220 companies produce pulp and/or paper in Brazil; 2000 
sales reached US$ 7.5 billion; sales of the largest 11 integrated companies reached 2/3 of this total, 
revealing, for this industry, the importance of plant and company level economies of scale. During that 
year, the 4 largest producers of pulp – Klabin, Aracruz, Suzano, Votorantim- were responsible for 70% of 
total production. In paper production, concentration levels are smaller, but have been increasing since 1990. 
In that year, the 5 largest producers were responsible for 39.5% of total production; ten years later this 
share increased to 51.4%. In different segments of the paper industry, concentration levels are higher, and 
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similar to those prevailing in pulp production. Three companies control the production of printing paper; in 
packing paper, one company, Klabin, dominated 40% of the market in 2000. These concentration levels 
were increased by means of a very active process of mergers and acquisitions, as shown in Table 19. This 
process is very similar to international trends. 
TABLE 19 
MOST RELEVANT M&A IN THE BRAZILIAN PULP AND PAPER (1992-2001) 
Company Sold Commanding Company Date Share Product Annual Capacity 
     1000 t 
Simão Votorantim 1992 100% CFCB + Printing paper 250 
Kimberly Clark Melhoramentos 1994 100% Tissue 25 
Iguaçu Cel.Papel Sonoco Do Brasil 1995 100% Kraft low gramature 20 
Nicolaus Papeis Ahlstrom Papeis 1995 100% filter 4 
J.Bresler Orsa 1996 100% Packing 35 
Mad. Sguário Orsa 1996 100% Packing 90 
Nicolaus Papeis Md Papeis 1997 100% Special Paper + Cardboard 70 
Pirahy Schweitzer Mauduit 1998 100% Special Paper 48 
Fab.Papel Guaiba Santher 1998 100% Tissue 20 
Klabin Tissue Kimberly Klabin 1998 50% Tissue 155 
Inpacel Champion / International Paper 1998 100% LWC 185 
Celpav Votorantim 1988 100% Printing paper 100 
Trombini* Igaras 1998 100% Packing  
Igaras Suzano 1996  Packing 360 / 460 
Igaras Klabin/Riverwwod 2000 100% Pulp / kraftliner 360 / 460 
Salto Arjo Wiggins 1999 100% Safety Paper  27 
Veracel 
Aracruz 
+Storaenso 
2001 100% Acquisition of 10% da Oderbrecht 
Conpel Grupo De Pauli 1999 100% Packing/bags 28 
Bacraft Klabin / Kimberly 1999 100% Tissue 15 
Lalekla Klabi7n 1999 100% Tissue  
Klabin Joint Venture until 2002 2000 50+50% Newsprinting Paper 120 
 Norske Skog     
Jarcel Orsa 2000 100% Pulp 300 
Bacell Klabin Lenzig Nd  Pulp 100 
Cataguases Grupo Ibéria Nd  Packing 50 
Iberkraft Grupo Ibéria Nd  Packing 25 
Pisa Norske Skog 2000 100% PAR + Newsprinting Paper 270 / 190 
Champion L. International Paper 2000 100% Pulp + Printing Paper. 305 / 365 
Ind.Papel Sto.Amaro Ipb-Ind.Pap.Da Bahia 2000 100% Long Fibre Pulp + Packing 42 / 56 
Agaprint Rigesa 2000 100% Packing  
Bahia Sul Suzano 2001 100% Pulp + Paper 600 / 250 
Cenibra Jbp 2001 100% Pulp 830 
Portucel Suzano + Sonae 2001 28% Pulp + Paper 400 BEKP 
Aracruz 
Votorantim Acquisition of 
26% of  Mondi 
2001 26% Pulp  
Pisa Norske 2001  Paper  
Source: Fonseca (2002) 
 
4.2.3. Citrus 
Some of the 1990s competitive challenges facing the industry, like the need to close relations with 
distribution channels have been dealt with and presently the industry is stronger than before. Others 
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challenges remain. Most firms are still distant from final consumers; they are specialised in trading and 
producing to specifications for corporations that aggregate value to the product, selling them to shops, 
supermarkets or directly to the final consumer. Curiously, even in this relatively homogenous industry, the 
dual track pattern observed in the steel and in the pulp and paper industries are also present. In the Frozen 
Concentrated Orange Juice – FCOJ- segment, Brazil is an efficient exporter; in the Pasteurised Orange 
Juice –POJ-, segment, sales are directed to the local market. The latter requires more sophisticated 
industrial operations and it is very close to the final consumer market, requiring significant marketing 
efforts. 
During the past 10 years, the Brazilian industry has consolidated its leading international position in the 
FCOJ segment and is facing an expanding local market in the POJ segment. Market perspectives are very 
reasonable, especially in the POJ and natural juice segments; in the US, annual consumption levels of POJ 
reach 40 litres; in Brazil total orange juice consumption is around 20 litres/year; only 1 litre is POJ but 
annual rates of growth in this segment are very high, at around 30%. 
Brazil still is the most important international player in this industry; during most of the 1990s 50% of total 
world orange juice and 80% of FCOJ were produced in Brazil, generating, in average, US$ 1 billion in 
annual exports. Similarly to other commodity producers, Brazil is very dependent on fluctuations of 
international prices; while total exports of FCOJ expanded from 785 million tons in 1990, to 1,030 million 
tons in 1995 and 1,234 million in 2000, export revenues, that have reached a peak of US$ 1.3 billion, 
decreased to US$ 800 million in 2001.  
The industry’s high market share has brought about reactions from important consumer/producer countries 
that have imposed important trade barriers to the Brazilian like the USA 56% ad valorem tariff. The most 
important markets are the US, Japan and Europe. The most developed markets are stagnating; it is 
estimated that West Europeans consume 24 litres of fruit juice per year, while East Europeans consume 5 
litres per year. However, this market is very promising, having expanded 80% between 1995 and 2000.  
The competitiveness of this industry is to be found in efficient industrial operations, in privileged access to 
inputs and in mastering and accessing a sophisticated transport infrastructure. The relevant transport 
infrastructure is related to specialised orange juice carriers, requiring a technical sophistication similar to a 
chemical vessel. In relation the agriculture base of the industry, Table 20 below informs how productivity 
has expanded, due to increases in plantation intensiveness and greater use of fertilisers, while total 
plantation area has decreased in the last decade. There has been considerable technological efforts to 
improve the industry’s agricultural base; the most significant achievement was the DNA sequencing of 
genome of the bacteria Xyllela Fastidiosa, that provokes diseases to crops. Even though theses figures 
suggest a worrisome trends for agriculture productivity, orange plantation is still economically attractive; 
its price per hectare is five times greater than those observed for soy and 70 % higher than coffee prices. 
TABLE 20 
THE AGRICULTURE OF BRAZILIAN ORANGE 
Year Area (ha 1,000) Box/tree Box/ha Fertiliser (kg/ha) 
1985  2.0 452  
1990  1.9 419  
1995 856 2.0 519 75.73 
2001 821 1.8 532 116.36 
Source: compiled from Neves & Marino (2002) 
In the FCOJ segment, the processing industry is the coordinator of the associated logistics: from providing 
technical and financial support to orange plantations to the timely delivery to distribution channels or 
directly to the packaging industry. Their co-ordinating capabilities is so developed that important clients, 
like Coca-Cola, have transferred the managing of their juice production units, in the USA, to a Brazilian 
company. This is an important change from the early 1990s; to by pass import restrictions, the most active 
firms have moved to the south of the USA, acquiring or investing in new processing units and even some 
plantations. The largest corporations have also increased their economic power; if in the early 1990s very 
few firms dominated Brazilian exports; in 1997 the share of the largest four producers was 70%; in 2001 
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this share had increased to 90%. But, even so, these firms remain distant from final consumers; they are 
typically commodity producers, relying competitiveness on the low cost of their undifferentiated product. 
In the segment of pasteurised orange juice, a segment that has been expanding at high rates in Brazil, the 
market structure is relatively different. As shown in Table 21, searching for  economies of scale, a dual 
verticalisation strategy is implemented by different corporations, along the production chain. In one 
extreme, close to the resource base, processing firms are verticalised towards packaging operations. On the 
other extreme, close to the final consumer, selling companies, including supermarkets exploring their own 
brands, incorporate distribution activities. The relations between these two extremes are mediated, in most 
cases, by supply contracts among different companies. The exception is Parmalat, a highly verticalised 
corporation and Yes, that contracts to Paulista their distribution activities. It is worth mentioning that the 
three leading FCOJ producers – Sucocitro Cutrale, Citrosuco Paulista and Coinbra-Frutesp do not 
participate in supply contracts of POJ to the major selling companies, contrary to the dual market segment 
strategies of Citrovita (the 4th largest) and Cargill (the 7th largest). 
 
TABLE 21 
VERTICALIZATION AND SUPPLY CONTRACTS IN THE PASTEURIZED ORANGE JUICE PRODUCTION 
CHAIN 
1- Selling 
company 
2- Distribution 
company 
Relation 1x2 3- Packaging 
company 
Relation 2x3 4- Processing 
company 
Relation 3x4 
Nestle Nestle Vertical Cargill Contract Cargill Vertical 
Dan’ Fresh Danone Vertical Citrovita Contract Citrovita Vertical 
Leco Leco Vertical Citrovita Contract Citrovita Vertical 
Yes Paulista Contract Cargill Contract Cargill Vertical 
Parmalat Parmalat Vertical Parmalat Vertical Parmalat Vertical 
Carrefour Carrefour Vertical Cargill Contract Cargill Vertical 
Sendas Sendas Vertical Nova América Contract Nova América Vertical 
Source: compiled from  Neves & Marino (2002) 
 
 
5. DURABLES: INWARD INTERNATIONALIZATION AND CACTHING UP IN MIDDLE 
INCOME SEGMENTS  
5.1. PATTERN OF COMPETITION NOW AND THEN: INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DIFFERENTIATION 
The market structure of durable industries, like consumer electronics and automobile industries, is 
characterised by few firms, implementing aggressive strategies towards a global market. Intense product 
renewal through continuously incorporating greater technological content prevails. To a large extent, 
competitiveness is defined by the capability of firms to differentiate products and to impose new consumer 
standards, associated with the intra and inter-firm co-ordination for the assembly of a wide number of 
components, in large scale. Thus, leading firms in this group are those capable of successfully exploiting 
economies of scale and scope. Accordingly, a differentiated and concentrated oligopoly is the prevailing 
market structure, meaning that firms must master competitive advantages by large-scale production of 
differentiated goods. These trends already successful competitive drivers, in the early 1990s were further 
stressed since then. (see first two columns of Table 22) 
For competitive firms, the emphasis on product differentiation imply the promotion and the attraction of 
demand, through constant introduction of new products with sets of desirable – from a consumer 
perspective- attributes, such as price, brand, technology, and technical assistance. To achieve these product 
attributes, firms must invest in product development and in post-sales assistance, through authorised 
retailers’ network. Firms are constantly trying to create or expand market segments, in order to amortise 
investments costs associated with product development and new or renewed installations. 
Durable industries assemble products in large scale. To be competitive, it is mandatory to respect 
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minimum requirements of technical and management scales. The large minimum efficient scale becomes, 
then, a significant barrier to entry: incumbent firms must implement investment strategies that anticipate 
market growth and have to try to expand market shares through constant product differentiation. It is also 
relevant to operate production systems with increasing ratios of technical efficiency and quality. Guided by 
principles established by Japanese firms many years ago, leading players have entered a trajectory of 
“slim” production, composed by a set of techniques that combine increasing process flexibility with the 
most favourable aspects of traditional Fordist model of production. Such strategy implies an increasing 
intensiveness in the use of microelectronic based automation and organisational techniques, devoted to 
continuous improvement of production processes, including production organised around cells. Relative to 
Fordist systems, production systems of this nature require less but highly qualified workers. 
Due to the high ratio of components to production value, since the early 1990s, there has been a clear trend 
towards vertical disintegration, combined with new forms of articulation between assembler and suppliers. 
In relation to suppliers, essential competitive factors are: delivery times; price; technical conformity; stable 
industrial contracts incorporating the transfer of stock administration costs to suppliers; and, joint 
development of components that must be designed to fit in assembling units of final products. Under a 
global trade liberalisation context, firms have been developing global sourcing systems. 
Investments carried out in these sectors normally induce dynamic effects in a host economy, directly or 
indirectly, including changing and upgrading the nature of employment and the modernisation of a region. 
In any part of the world there is always a fierce competition by local authorities to attract companies 
announcing new investment plans. That is the reason why these authorities provide generous fiscal 
incentives to attract these set of activities. 
 
TABLE 22 
PATTERNS OF COMPETITION (POC) AND COMPETITIVENESS IN DURABLES: NOW AND THEN 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGES 
PoC DIFFERENTIATION 
RELEVANT DRIVERS 
1990 
PoC DIFFERENTIATION 
RELEVANT DRIVERS 
2002 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 1990 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 2002 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
MANAGEMENT  co-ordination capabilities  Lack of capabilities Closing gap with international practices 
PRODUCTION organisational flexibility  Organisational rigidity Closing gap with international practices 
SALES Brand image 
 NO CHANGE with increasing 
importance of information technologies Brand image Closing gap with international practices 
INNOVATION product & components design  Local design capabilities but outdated 
products 
Demobilisation of local capabilities but 
outsourcing of updated products 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 Segmentation by quality and marketing 
 
INCREASED Low segmentation 
 
Specialisation in middle range segments 
 
MARKET 
Price, brand, technological content, 
technical assistance 
 
INCREASED High price, low technological content 
Increased competition but instability 
remains 
 regional & global trade INCREASED Distant from international networks Regionalisation of markets; less threat of 
competition from imports 
 
firm and plant level economies of scale 
& scope 
 
INCREASED Scale deficiencies in most product lines 
Optimisation through specialisation 
 
CONFIGURATION OF INDUSTRY 
articulation assembler-supplier, 
distribution 
 
INCREASED Infant articulation Closing relations with suppliers 
 metrology & standardisation NO CHANGE Adequate Adequate 
 Property rights NO CHANGE Low levels of compliance Enforcement of property rights  
REGIME OF REGULATION  AND  Consumer legislation NO CHANGE Infant legislation Stricter legislation 
INCENTIVES Consumer credit NO CHANGE Inexistent Variation according to macroeconomic 
conditions 
 Fiscal incentives NO CHANGE Inexistent Extensive use of local incentives 
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5.2. COMPETITIVENESS IN 2002: EXPANSION, MODERNISATION AND PRODUCT UPGRADING. BUT, 
DEMAND CONTRAINTS STILL IMPOSE LIMITS TO FURTHER GROWTH  
The consumer electronics and the automobile industries were strongly impacted by the Real plan in 1994, 
associated with trade liberalisation. On one hand, price stabilisation, anchored in local currency 
overvaluation, provoked an “income effect” that sharply expanded demand levels; on the other hand, the 
late 1980s trade liberalisation was reinforced, imposing new benchmarks for product attributes, like price 
and technical specification. 
During the 1990s, firms in Brazil not only demonstrated the capacity to resist competitive pressure but, in 
fact, a significant number of them implemented pro-active strategies to exploit demand expansion, through 
investment in new plants and products. (see last two columns in Table 22) New entry was also observed, 
by means of green field investment or the acquisition of existing businesses. By 2003, the 
internationalisation of ownership, already a structural feature in these industries, was practically completed. 
Representatives of most international leading players do operate in Brazil. 
Overall, in respect of durable industrial group, it is possible to identify a reasonably homogeneous feature, 
in terms of product and investment strategies. Regardless they are TV or car producers, along the past 
decade, the presence of transnational affiliates, with similar capabilities and performance, has increased. 
Firms have fiercely disputed market shares through investment in modernising and expanding productive 
capacity – acquiring local firms in the consumer electronic and autoparts industries and building of new 
production units in the automotive sector-. Given these investments, in the international scenario, Brazil 
has become an important production platform of middle range, but technically upgraded products, like sub-
compact cars. But, given the oscillating and low growth trends of the Brazilian economy throughout the 
decade, most firms have yet to make full use of new installations.  
For firms from this industrial group, current competitive challenges are related to the consolidation of their 
relevance as producers of middle range but reliable products, for the local, regional and international 
markets. This involves expanding their presence in international, especially intra regional trade flows and 
the further exploitation of opportunities in global sourcing. This is especially true in a context of low 
growth of the Brazilian market. But, given existing idle capacity, even in a scenario of an expanding local 
demand, most firms are well placed to sustain competitiveness, especially from imports, in the years to 
come. 
5.2.1. The consumer electronic industry 
The Brazilian consumer electronic industry, is located mostly at the “Zona Franca de Manaus” (a duty-free 
assembling zone). During the last decade it has faced different periods of adaptation and change. After a 
recessive beginning, in the early 1990s, leading manufacturers of audio and video segments improved their 
economic performance, due to a significant increase in consumption levels, mostly from lower social 
classes. As a result, in 1996, sales of TV sets amounted to an unprecedented level of 8,5 millions units. But, 
as shown in Figure 9, just as production expanded, it has quickly contracted, during the second half of the 
1990s.  
This inverted V shape of domestic sales reveals two main features of consumer electronic goods: firstly 
and most important, these trends are a good proxy of uncertainty levels prevailing in the Brazilian 
economy since the 1980s, a period of frequent oscillating cycles of growth levels; secondly, the vitality of 
local producers, capable of responding to demand expansion by quickly promoting new investment. 
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FIGURE 9 
INDUSTRIAL SALES IN DOMESTIC MARKET OF BRAZILIAN ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY (UNITIES) 
2.294.000
3.399.000
6.065.972
8.541.638
7.835.957
5.835.788
4.047.235
5.289.154
2.443.000
2.314.000
4.984.783
4.717.447
0
1.000.000
2.000.000
3.000.000
4.000.000
5.000.000
6.000.000
7.000.000
8.000.000
9.000.000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CD players Sistemas de áudio Rádio/ gravs. fita-cassete Camcorders TVs em cores Videocassetes DVD-players
 
Source: Sá (2002) 
That is, the market expansion of the first half of the 1990s has induced the entry of new players and growth 
of incumbent competitors, both seeking to move into markets other than where they were placed at. It is 
worth emphasising that leading international players, such as Phillips, Panasonic, Sanyo and Toshiba have 
been operating in Brazil since the 1980s, thus, reproducing the international oligopoly structure in the 
Brazilian domestic market .  
Sony, and the national firms CCE and Gradiente, which have been traditional players in the audio 
segments, strived to expand sales by diversifying into TV and video markets. Another national firm, 
Cineral, signed a joint-venture agreement with Daewoo to enter the audio and video markets. Moreover, 
the Koreans Samsung Electroncis and LG entered the country through new investments in the video 
segment. 
However, in the end of the 1990s, this favourable environment started to change. A new and difficult 
macroeconomic scenario emerged. High levels of credit default of low budget consumers damaged sales of 
major shopping outlets, leading to the bankruptcy of leading chains, thereby reducing revenue sales of 
most electronic manufacturers. The consumer electronic industry went through a reorganisation process. 
Daewoo closed their operation plants, the Brazilian subsidiary of Sharp defaulted, and Samsung 
Electronics decided to focus their activities on mobile telephony. In this aspect, due to privatisation of the 
national telecommunications sector, the expansion of the mobile market quickly became a really attractive 
option to diversification. This explains why Gradiente, in association with Nokia, moved into this market.  
Meanwhile, on the freezers, fridges, cookers and washing machines segments, an unprecedented entry of 
foreign players through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) operations was observed. Eletrolux acquired the 
Brazilian group Refripar; Whirlpool bought a majority position in the largest national group, Brasmotor; 
Siemens-Bosch acquired Continental; Seb bought Arno; and, Tsann Kuen has settled a joint venture with 
Sector, a Brazilian company. These foreign firms used M&A operations not only as a way to quickly 
access market-share and distribution networks of national firms, but also as a mode to move themselves 
into markets which was growing more rapidly than their traditional ones. 
Its is relevant to acknowledge the product strategy adopted by international players. In Brazil they 
  
36
implemented policies different from those employed in their original countries – or original markets – 
where they compete by trying to assume a leading role in defining technological standards. In the Brazilian 
market, firms implemented a market segment focused strategy, upgrading quality and other product 
attributes levels, but, at the same time, relying on internationally established technology standards. This 
option can be explained by three factors: firstly, competitive pressure from imports impose minimum 
levels for product attributes; secondly, the focus on middle range products is associated with the structural 
features of local demand and the most promising market segments, that is, low-budget consumers; thirdly, 
their inability to compete with low-end products, produced in very large scale and imported from Asian 
countries. 
By the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian consumer electronic manufacturers faced a new challenge: the 
devaluation of the national currency. Devaluation had an immediate effect in  raising debt levels of firms, 
which had borrowed in foreign currency. Devaluation was also followed by a slower rate of economic 
growth. In 2000, sales revenue of audio and video markets plummeted to US$3.5 billion, well  bellow the 
US$ 8.1 billion reached in 1996.  
The Brazilian industry has yet to compensate these trends with a greater exposure to international trade; 
exports in the audio and video segments have remained at around US$ 350 million since 1990, 
representing a very small proportion of local sales; imports of final goods are around US$ 150 million, 
increasing to US$ 450 million, when local demand expands. 
The main destinations of these exports were Argentina, Hungry, Italy and Spain. Nevertheless, this good 
performance has not been able to compensate the significant increase on the value of imports of electronic 
components that came from South Korea and Japan. As shown in Figure 10, although the industry has 
reduced its trade deficit, from US$ 1.56 billion in 1997 to US$ 1.06 billion in 2000, the lack of production 
capacity in components constitute a structural weakness of this industry. 
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FIGURE 10 
TRADE DEFICIT IN ÁUDIO & VÍDEO COMPONENTS 
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Source: Sá (2002) 
 
5.2.2.  The automotive industry 
Competitive catching up, in the relevant segments where it operates, is the main feature of the Brazilian 
automotive industry during the 1990s. This process was undertaken by four sets of interrelated investments 
in:  i) new and renewing existing industrial plants; ii) launching of new products; iii) improving the 
productive-chain organisation mode and, iv) promoting intra regional trade, particularly between Brazil 
and Argentina. Moreover, new firms have entered the country, adding up capacity and competitive 
pressure in the local market. Similarly to the consumer electronic industry, Brazil has consolidated an 
important international position in middle range segments of this industry. 
Three basic conditions were of fundamental importance: the regional integration that reduced intra-firm 
costs, expanded potential gains derived from economies of scale and induced specialisation; economic 
liberalisation – inducing imports and entry by new firms- that brought about competitive pressures for 
established firms to update products and modernise installations; economic incentives for firms and 
consumers that were vital for expanding local demand. 
Thus, the most relevant fact that marked the industry in the 1990s is the significant increase in annual 
average investments: from US$ 500 million in the 1980s, to US$ 1.3 billion between 1990 and 1995 and 
US$ 2 billion during the second half of the 1990s. During the decade, investments in the assembly industry 
amounted to US$ 16.5 billion and, in autoparts, to US$ 12.1 billion. Table 23, below, informs new added 
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capacity to the car assembly segment.  
TABLE 23 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY - NEW ASSEMBLY PLANTS, 1996-2000 
Firm Type of Good Location Year 
Volkswagen Engines São Carlos-SP 1996 
Volkswagen Lorries and buses   Resende-RJ 1996 
Honda Cars Sumaré-SP 1997 
Mitsubishi Light commercial vehicles Catalão-GO 1998 
Renault Cars and engines São José dos Pinhais-PR 1998 
Toyota Cars Indaiatuba-SP 1998 
Daimler Chrysler Cars Campo Largo- PR 1999 
GM Components Mogi das Cruzes-SP 1999 
Volkswagen-Audi Cars São José dos Pinhais-PR 1999 
Fiat Cars Juiz de Fora – MG 2000 
GM Cars Gravataí-RS 2000 
Iveco Engines Sete Lagoas-MG 2000 
Ford Cars Camaçari-BA 2001 
 Nissan Light commercial vehicles São José dos Pinhais-PR 2001 
Peugeot-Citroen Cars and engines Porto Real-RJ 2001 
Source: Sarti (2002) 
 
While new entrants in car assembly increased competitive pressure, in the autoparts investment trends also 
brought in new firms but not via green field. Following an international trend, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) was the relevant mode of entry of newcomers into the Brazilian autoparts. Hence, only a small part 
of these investments were devoted to increase productive capacity. As a result, higher rates of 
internationalisation and market concentration were observed. In 1994, local capital was responsible for at 
least 50% of total capital, sales and investment. By the end of the decade, the share of locally owned firms 
was down to approximately 25%. 
Regardless of ownership changes, investments were significant and the Brazilian competitive gap was 
significantly shortened, in terms of product attributes and efficiency levels of installations. As an example, 
GM’s plant in the southern city of Gravataí operates with a high degree of automation (113 robots) and it is 
organised in modular systems, involving first degree suppliers. Assembly times are at around 13 hours, 
compared to average 22 hours in other GM plants. In other words, these investments brought about 
expansion of capacity, new machinery, new organisational formats, new product portfolio and changes 
with in relations with suppliers. In aggregate terms, as shown in Table 24, there were significant increases 
in productivity - the number of cars produced by worker has grown three times in the period 1990-2001, 
reaching 21.3 units in 2001. 
TABLE 24 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY IN CAR ASSSEMBLY 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2001 
Employment 117,396 105,664 107,134 101,857 83,049 85,257 
Labour productivity* 7.8 10.2 14.8 17.7 19.1 21.3 
* units per worker 
Source: Sarti (2002) 
 
It is clear that the 170% accumulated growth in productivity was related to increases in production levels 
coupled with decreases in employment. In average, production expanded at 6.4% while employment levels 
fell by 2.9% in average, during the 1990s. During this period while production levels doubled, 32 thousand 
work positions were eliminated, outsourced or transferred between firms along production chains. 
At this point, it is important to call attention to changes in the organisation of production and in the mode 
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of relations prevailing between assembly and suppliers. Firstly, they were called to operate very close to 
assembly units, to enable just in time operations. Every new installation in Brazil was designed under the 
concept of condominium, were specific areas were designed to be occupied by selected autoparts 
corporations that would enjoy exclusive relations with assemblers but, in compensation, would also bear 
and share investment costs. Secondly, in order to deal with these new mode of relations, auto parts 
companies – now, for most part subsidiaries of key international players – developed an intense intra-firm 
trade, thereby expanding auto parts imports from their original transnational corporations. From 1989 to 
2001, imports increased 300%, reaching US$ 4.3 billions in 2001 and a trade deficit of US$ 445 million. 
Against this context of expansion, modernisation and ownership change, auto sales in Brazil presented a 
clear growing pattern during the first part of the 1990s, departing from 713 thousand units in 1990 to 1.9 
million in 1997 and 1.6 million units in 2001. Most auto assemblers operating in Brazil have strongly 
specialised in the subcompact segment, with engines on the 1000 to 2000cc range. In 2001, 71% of 
domestic production was related to this segment. While specialisation may have positive effects in terms of 
economies of scale, potential profitability levels are low and acceptability of national production in foreign 
markets is narrow. On the other hand, concentration of production (and sales) in this particular segment 
provides a protection to the Brazilian auto industry against foreign competition. International trade of the 
Brazilian auto industry was marked by a strong complementarity with Argentina. Firms operating in each 
country tried to take advantage from complementarity between their product lines. After a brief expansion 
in the post-trade liberalisation years, the level of cars imports in Brazil was reduced, having equalled the 
average level of US$ 2 billions in the biennium 2000/2001, while in the period 1995-1998 the average 
value was equivalent to US$ 3.3 billions. Almost 66% of these imports came from Argentina. By the same 
token, 44% of the imports made from Argentina comes from Brazil.   
In short, the Brazilian auto industry has managed to significantly close down the technological gap 
accumulated throughout the 1980s. The industry has been enlarged, by existing producers and new comers; 
product portfolio and production systems have been updated to international levels. However, its relative 
size and mode of international insertion is, still, relatively modest. Established affiliates are not 
economically expressive world-wide; only Fiat, Volkswagen and Scania have local operations  amounting 
to more than 5% of total corporate business. Moreover, local demand levels never fulfilled new added 
capacity, remaining, in 2001, at 40%, much above the international average of 25%. Therefore, two 
possible scenarios can be drawn; on one hand, local industry has the supply resources, if demand levels 
expand. The export potential of the industry is also significant and Brazil can further explore international 
markets in the subcompact segments; on the other hand, if demand levels remain low, rationalisation, 
closing down of operations and even the exit of producers is a strong possibility in the years to come. 
 
6. TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES: COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINTS ARE STILL DEFINED BY 
UNEQUAL INCOME LEVELS 
6.1. PATTERN OF COMPETITION NOW AND THEN: MARKET SEGMENTATION CUM NETWORKING 
Final consumption is the common destination of products generated in traditional related industries. 
Market segmentation is extensive and an inherent feature of these industries. Thus variety prevails, in 
terms of number and technical specifications of products, nature of production processes (assembly, flow 
and batch production) and minimum size of technical economies of scale, verticalisation and outsourcing 
levels and organisational format of companies. 
Industries are very sensitive to oscillations in demand and responsiveness is the key competitive driver of 
these industries. (see first two columns in Table 25) Sensitivity is expressed by two means, both with direct 
implications over production capabilities. Firstly, with considerable marketing efforts, companies 
constantly have to introduce new product designs, creating niches or imposing themselves in their markets. 
If successful, immediate demand expansion follows. Thus, they must increase production levels to 
corresponding growth of demand, while keeping delivery times under control. Secondly, demand levels are 
subject to seasonal oscillations, imposing adequate adaptation to production levels. Compliance to these 
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two sources of oscillations in demand is facilitated by the relatively technical easiness and low investment 
costs in expanding production in short time. In fact, regardless the importance of imposing new consumer 
habits, investment by firms in these industries are reactive to changes in demand levels. 
The extent of market segmentation is defined by the size and income levels of a given consumer 
population. In such a context, the degree of importance for competitiveness of product attributes like price, 
brand and adequacy to use will be directly related to income levels of those consumers groups aimed at by 
corporations. The higher the income levels, the less relative importance the price attribute will have and the 
greater the value of attributes associated with attending particular specifications of clients. Nationwise, if 
high income levels prevail, similar competent firms will co-exist but operating in different market 
segments. Otherwise, where income differentials are significant, firms with very differentiated 
competences but operating in similar markets, will survive. It is important to remark that, given the 
relatively low unit value of traditional products in consumer baskets, high levels of product renovation and 
differentiated competences among firms may prevail, even in a context of very unequal income levels, but 
where the absolute size of the market is expressive, as in the case of Brazil. 
Entrepreneurial skills to promote product renovation and to keep updated organisational formats - 
especially in relation to design, marketing, quality systems and relations with suppliers- are essential for 
competitive success in these industries. The basic sources of technical change for these industries come 
from equipment and input supplier industries; in the past 10 years an increasing role has been played by 
information technology related equipment and chemical plus biotechnology related inputs. Those 
corporations capable of accessing these inputs in better terms will definitely enjoy competitive advantages.  
In general privileged access is related to size: smaller companies can survive in specific market niches, but 
they may face economic and financial difficulties in mobilising the necessary resources to fully enjoy 
equipment and input sources of competitive advantage. Given the inherent economic variety of this 
industry, this may be the basic reason behind an increasing trend towards companies organising themselves 
around local productive clusters –organised horizontally and/or vertically-. Through local clusters 
companies can benefit from another source of competitive advantage: economies of agglomeration, 
through which they share costs associated with any and every kind of their economic activity: 
infrastructure, labour and other inputs, design and marketing, information systems, etc. 
 
6.2. COMPETITIVENESS IN 2002: INCREASING RESPONSIVENESS BUT HETEROGENEITY STILL 
PREVAILS 
Traditional industries are among the oldest industrial activities in Brazil and competitive heterogeneity was 
and still is their relevant structural feature. The co-existence of very differentiated levels of competences 
among firms in each sector –and even among stages of production, within a given firm – can be directly 
associated with the country’s remarkable uneven income distribution profile. In 1990 competitiveness was 
directly associated with size: large firms were likely to be more competent than their smaller counterparts.  
Larger firms were able to explore different market segments, to invest in modernisation and to export. The 
analysis of textile, shoe and furniture industries indicate that, in 2003, the 1990 basic structural feature of 
these industries –their competitive heterogeneity- still prevails. But, as shown in the last two columns of 
Table 25, some progress has also been observed. The rate of product renovation has increased, through 
explicit and increased design efforts. Production modernisation has been facilitated by the incorporation of 
more efficient. Local clusters have emerged in increasing number and are being consolidated in different 
industries and regions of the country. Companies have further explored low labour cost opportunities, by 
transferring installations to the Northeast of the country. 
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TABLE 25 
Patterns of competition (POC) and competitiveness in Traditional Industries: now and then 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGES 
PoC RESPONSIVENESS  
RELEVANT DRIVERS 
1990 
PoC RESPONSIVENESS  
RELEVANT DRIVERS  
2002 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 1990 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 2002 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
MANAGEMENT Entrepreneurial skills 
More importance of creating new market 
segments 
Existence of a core group of competitive 
firms; size and nationality heterogeneity 
Increased heterogeneity: leaders close to the 
international frontier; reliance on 
outsourcing and low labour costs 
PRODUCTION Quality control Increasing trends towards greater 
flexibility and outsourcing 
Incipient Increased competence 
SALES Market information Increasing importance of marketing Incipient Increased competences 
INNOVATION Embodied technology, learning by doing Increasing importance of design Copying strategy Similar, improvements in few segments and 
products 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 Segmentation by levels of income & 
type of product 
INCREASED Limited segmentation due to inequalities 
in income levels 
Inequalities remain but segmentation 
increased 
MARKET Price, brand, delivery times, customer 
orientation 
INCREASED Low use of product attributes Higher use of price attributes, increased 
competition 
 Local & international trade 
INCREASED importance of insertion on 
international supply chains 
Potential large size of national market 
but reliance on local  
trade; threats from imports 
Demand fluctuation due to economic 
instability; incipient international exposure 
 Economies of agglomeration and 
networking 
GREAT INCREASE Limited to few segments Some dissemination of local arrangements; 
relocalisation due to labour costs 
CONFIGURATION OF INDUSTRY Efficient supply of equipment NO CHANGE Deficient supply of equipment Expansion of equipment imports with better 
price/efficiency ratio 
 
Metrology, standardisation, certification 
& accreditation; market & technical 
information; training 
NO CHANGE Low efforts and lack of co-ordination 
Improvements restricted to medium and 
large companies  
 Anti-dumping INCREASED, due preferential access in 
bilateral agreements 
Low use  Increased use in local markets 
REGIME OF REGULATION  AND  Competition & consumer policies NO CHANGE Infant, unfair competition from informal 
sector 
Increased but still incipient importance; 
unfair competition from informal sector 
remains 
INCENTIVES Support for SME INCREASED in size and scope Lack of effective instruments 
Improvements in support for management 
but lack of financial instruments remain 
 Tax system NO CHANGE Anti-competitiveness bias Bias remain 
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6.2.1. The shoe industry 
The geography of shoe production is dictated, to a great extent, by labour costs. International 
competitiveness is defined by wage levels as well as the relation between exchange rate and wage rate. 
Thus, to a great extent, this is a nomad industries, moving toward regions where labour costs are more 
attractive. This is a labour intensive industry and because of its technical  “easiness”, in terms of 
knowledge and capital inputs, this industrial activity may be found in most nations, around the world. 
Employment in selected countries can be found in Table 26. It is worth mentioning that between 1980 and 
1997 world employment fell by 13%, reaching 1.7 million. 
TABLE 26 
SHOE INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1998 
Relative position Countries Number of employees (1.000 workers) 
1 China (*) 923.0 
3 Brasil 147.5 
4 India 134.7 
6 Italy 79.0 
15 USA 42.7 
(*) 1994  
Source: Compiled from Costa (2002) 
 
As shown in Table 27, in Brazil, during the 1990s, the industry produced, annually, at least 500 million 
pairs of shoes, 70% of them delivered to the local market. Imports are very local, at around 1% of national 
production. 
TABLE 27 
BRAZILIAN SHOE PRODUCTION –SELECTED YEARS 
Year Production (million of pairs) 
1990 509 
1995 543 
1999 500 
2000 530 
Source: Costa (2002) 
 
Until the 1990s, Brazilian most exports were directed to market segments where the price attribute is 
relevant. International clients would define technical specifications and brand names and sell them world-
wide. In despite of competitive pressure from Chinese producers –that occupy similar market segments -, 
export performance has evolved positively during the 1990s. As shown in Table 28, exports increased from 
US$ 1.1 billion in 1990 to US$ 1.6 billion, in 2001 and unit prices have increased, indicating that the local 
industry is upgrading its product portfolio. It is necessary to bear in mind that since the 1999 devaluation 
may have helped exports. 
TABLE 28 
BRAZILIAN SHOE EXPORTS, SELECTED YEARS (VALUE, QUANTITY AND AVERAGE PRICE) 
Year Value (US$ million) Pairs (millions) Average price (US$) 
1990 1,107 143 7.74 
1995 1,414 138 10.25 
2000 1,547 163 9.52 
2001 1,615 171 9.43 
Source: Costa (2002) 
Other factors also helped the industry’s international performance: fiscal incentives and export credits; the 
consolidation of gains from economies of agglomeration, especially in the southern state of Rio Grande do 
Sul, the accumulated export experience. Nevertheless, labour costs still make up an important difference. 
In 1993 labour costs in Brazil were US$1 per man-hour, In Spain it was US$8, in Korea US$2.5, in China 
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US$0.5. 
The importance of the exchange/wage ratio can be seen in Table 29. During the 1994/98 period, when the 
Real was overvalued, total employment fell by 56 thousand. But, as demand expanded – between 1999 and 
2000 exports increased by US$ 270 million or 26 million pairs of shoes-, companies quickly contracted 29 
thousand extra workers. No apparent differences seems to exist in employment generation capacity, among 
different sizes of firms.  
TABLE 29 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE SHOE INDUSTRY ACCORDING TO SIZE OF FIRMS, SELECTED YEARS, (1,000 
WORKERS) 
Size 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Very small 23.1 21.4 18.9 16.9 19.6 24.2 
Small 36.9 37.0 43.8 38.7 34.6 47.9 
Medium 89.8 95.0 92.4 68.4 61.3 75.6 
Large 76.6 82.9 85.3 78.6 69.1 92.5 
Total 226.6 236.4 240.6 202.7 184.7 240.3 
Source Costa 2002 
In terms of industrial organisation, this is an industry where local capital is prevalent. In 2000, large size 
firms owned 1.3% of establishments, employing 38.5% of shoe workers while very small firms accounted 
for 77% of establishments and 10% of total employment. Exports concentration is also significant: in that 
year shoe exports (US$1.6 billion) were undertaken by 821 firms; 53% of this value was generated by 18 
firms. 
During the 1990s company strategies followed two directions. On one hand, firms implemented 
modernisation of production processes and product portfolio, including the introduction of automated 
equipment, new organisational techniques associated with increasing quality and decreasing waste and 
down time. There were also concerted efforts to increase product lines, associated with higher process 
flexibility. On the other hand, a significant number of companies migrated from Rio Grande do Sul to the 
Brazilian Northeast, especially Ceará and Bahia.  
In the Northeast firms enjoy lower labour costs and the benefit of special and generous incentives. These 
include: VAT exemption for fixed and running capital and municipal tax exemption, the supply of physical 
infrastructure, like land and electricity and partial but automatic export credits. Most important, not only 
relative labour costs are lower than those prevailing in the South. Most labour contracts are intermediated 
by co-operatives, providing exemptions from social overheads. The organisation of co-operatives, as well 
as most of the training costs are undertaken by local governments. Thus, by the late 1990s, the 
international competitiveness of the Brazilian show industry was ensured by the opening up production 
capacity in the Northeast. Curiously the, to a great extent, in this industry, the country’s structural 
heterogeneity has helped the survival and growth of firms in local and international markets. 
6.2.2. Textiles and garment 
Economic differences among the three most important segments –textiles, fibre and garment- of this 
industry can be found in Table 30. Combined sales of 22 thousand establishments, that employed 1.5 
million workers, amounted to US$ 45.2 billion, in 2000. 
The production of chemical fibres is technically more sophisticated and the size of operations is higher, in 
general, controlled by foreign owned firms. On the other extreme, in the garment industry, small and 
medium size, locally owed firms prevail, employing 1.2 million workers in 18.000 establishments.  
Contrary to the shoe industry, the international performance of the textile Brazilian industry, as shown in 
Table 31, was never economically significant, in despite of the fact that in some segments, like garment, 
competitiveness drivers are similar to those prevailing in shoe industry. Thus, Brazilian textile industry is, 
to a great extent, oriented towards the local market. 
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TABLE 30 
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOYMENT AND REVENUE SALES IN TEXTILE, FIBER AND 
GARMENT INDUSTRIES, 2000 
 Chemical Fibres Textiles Garment 
Establishments 25 3,305 18,797 
Employment (1,000) 15 339 1,233 
Production (1,000 ton/year) 640 1,750 1,287 
Sales/ year (U$ billion) 1.4 16.6 27.2 
Source: Prochnik (2002) 
 
TABLE 31 
TEXTILES AND GARMENT WORLD TRADE AND BRAZILIAN SHARE, 1995/2000 
Textiles 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
World trade (US$ billion) 111.1 113.6 119.3 112.5 113.0 126.1 
Brazil export share (%) 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.71 
Brazil import share (%) 1.23 0.98 1.01 0.95 0.79 0.88 
Garment       
World trade (US$ billion) 124.0 128.7 141.9 149.3 150.0 165.5 
Brazil export share (%) 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.17 
Brazil import share (%) 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.14 0.11 
Source: Compiled from Prochnik (2002) 
There is not a generic pattern of industrial organisation in this industry; firms may operate in a specific 
segment of textile production or may be vertically integrated, incorporating all stages of production, 
including garment. During the 1990s, as most other sectors, leading and especially large size firms went 
through an active process of modernisation, by means of machinery acquisition, introduction of new 
organisational techniques and, as in the shoe industry, migration to the Northeast of Brazil. 
Investment in modernisation was stimulated by three sources of dynamism. Firstly, during the first half of 
the 1990s, the Real Plan induced positive expectations in relation to growth of demand; secondly, starting 
in 1995, the national development bank, BNDES, financed a US$2 billion modernisation program for 
machinery acquisition, especially for larger firms; thirdly, import liberalisation and an overvalued Real on 
one hand, and advances in technology, on the other, resulted in the possibility of importing updated 
machinery at decreasing prices. (Table 32) 
TABLE 32 
TEXTILE MACHINERY: LOCAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS  (US$ MILLION)  
Year Local production Imports Total 
    
1990 307 377 684 
1995 316 738 1.054 
1999 185 373 558 
2000 185 453 638 
Source: Prochnik (2002) 
Investments in new machinery implied changes in production processes with negative impact on 
employment levels. As elsewhere in the Brazilian industry, employment levels in the textile and garment 
industries fell substantially along the 1990s, as shown in Table 33. 
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TABLE 33 
EMPLOYMENT IN TEXTILES AND GARMENT, 1990/2000, SELECTED YEARS (1,000 WORKERS) 
 1990 1995 1998 2000 % 
Textile 893.8 449.4 326.3 339.3 - 62,0 
Garment 1,755.8 1,468.1 1,237.2 1,233.2 - 29,8 
Total 2,649.6 1,917.5 1,563.5 1,572.5 - 40,7 
Source: Prochnik (2002) 
 
Finally, as in the shoe industry –for the same reasons and benefiting from similar incentives-an expressive 
process of relocation to the Northeast was undertaken (Table 34), especially by large size firms. 
 
TABLE 34 
SHARE OF DIFFERENT REGIONS IN BRAZILIAN TEXTILE PRODUCTION, 1990/2000 
Industry  Northeast Southeast South Total 
 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 - 
Fibre 24.9 35.4 55.2 42.6 17.2 21.7 100 
Fabric 17.6 21.5 65.6 62.0 12.8 13.7 100 
Knitted Garment 2.8 10.0 39.9 35.2 55.7 53.5 100 
Garment 8.0 11.3 66.6 56.1 21.6 25.4 100 
        
Total 13.3 19.6 56.8 49.0 26.8 28.5 100 
Source: Prochnik 2002 
 
 
7. INNOVATION CARRIERS: MOVING AHEAD, LAGGING BEHIND, COMPETITIVENESS 
IS STILL VERY WEAK 
7.1. PATTERN OF COMPETITION NOW AND THEN: THE INCREASING ROLE OF INNOVATION 
The innovation carriers industrial group brings together sectors that have in common the ability to induce 
technical progress to other economic activities, through the provision of equipments or components. 
The segmentation of markets demand is the main feature of the demand for these sectors. Since their 
products have specific applications, in general, each firm competes directly with very few other firms. The 
most competitive firms have evolved from equipment producers to providers of technical solutions and 
services to clients. Leading firms are notable in terms of high levels of expenses in R&D activities, 
reflecting the sectors’ most relevant competitive driver: the capacity to implement product innovations and 
to address particular demands of clients, in specific market segments. (see first two columns in Table 35) 
Innovation capability defines the most important barrier to entry in these sectors. For that reason, 
companies place significant resources to R&D activities. Their growing costs has led to the emergence of 
different forms of strategic alliances, mostly devoted to dilute technological risks of partners involved. 
These features define an important relationship between firms and research centres, of public or private 
nature. 
Due to its strategic role in any industrial matrix, nations with strong production capabilities have always 
implemented active industrial policies to promote and consolidate the competitiveness of their firms in 
local and international markets. Besides an active support to technological development, imports 
restrictions, favourable financing conditions, the purchasing power of governments, fiscal incentives are 
mechanisms used by nations.  
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TABLE 35 
Patterns of competition and competitiveness in innovation carriers: now and then 
SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGES 
PoC INNOVATION 
RELEVANT DRIVERS 
1993 
PoC INNOVATION 
RELEVANT DRIVERS  
2002 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 
1990 
BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITIVENESS 
2002 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
MANAGEMENT R&D-production-marketing integration NO CHANGE Low capabilities Low capabilities with increasing 
marketing efforts 
PRODUCTION Design for manufacturing NO CHANGE Some capabilities in mechanical 
engineering 
Reliance on imported design 
SALES Market creation & business to business 
marketing  
INCREASED due to the 
diffusion of IT 
Low capabilities Infant  
INNOVATION R&D + design NO CHANGE Low capabilities Increasing reliance on imported 
technology 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
 Segmentation by technical needs NO CHANGE Capabilities in lower end segments Increasing segmentation 
MARKET Attention to client specifications INCREASED Excessive standardisation Increasing responsiveness 
 Local & regional trade INCREASED 
Exports of standard and technologically 
simple equipment 
Increasing imports of components from 
OECD and exports of final goods to 
Latin America 
CONFIGURATION OF INDUSTRY Economies of specialisation Related diversification Excessive diversification and 
verticalisation 
No clear emerging pattern 
 Interaction with users INCREASED  Low interaction Increasing interaction 
 Science & technology systems INCREASED Incipient  Low technological investment 
 Intellectual property rights INCREASED Nationalistic oriented regulations 
Enforcement of property rights and 
stabilisation of rules 
REGIME OF REGULATION  AND  Selective protection DECREASED Nationalistic oriented regulations Excessive liberalisation 
INCENTIVES Risk support NO CHANGE Inexistent Limited 
 Credit for users NO CHANGE Limited Limited 
 State purchasing power DECREASED Few attempts towards articulation Disarticulated 
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7.2. COMPETITIVENESS IN 2002: ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IMPOSED CONTRADICTORY SIGNS. 
INNOVATION IS STILL GENERATED ABROAD 
Among all industrial groups, the Brazilian innovation carriers suffered the worst consequences from the 
economic liberalisation of the 1990s. Until then firms presented reasonable levels of production capacity 
and well-qualified human resources were available (mainly in the mechanical sector). This was a result of 
a long learning process carried out since the 1970s, partially as a result of an expanding market, partially as 
a result of active industrial policies. But, even then, most producers of mechanical engineering and 
electronic based equipment were not competitively strong. Their main features were high levels of 
verticalisation and diversification and dependence on foreign technological suppliers and  fragile relations 
between manufacturers and the R&D sector. 
Along the 1990s, producers of mechanical engineering and telecommunication equipments and computers 
reveal a common feature: an increase of production capabilities. However, this was not enough to resist 
foreign competitive pressures which is mainly based on intra-firms imports. (see last two columns of Table 
35)   
Apart from that, given very different framework conditions surrounding each of these sectors, a 
considerable competitive heterogeneity prevails. Suppliers for the telecommunications sector considerably 
expanded production capacity. Firms from the mechanical engineering sector promoted a modernisation 
process strongly associated with a significant decrease in production capacity. The performance of the 
computer manufacture sector was characterised by ownership internationalisation, substantial increases of 
component imports and by the implementation of new methods of labour management, which has lessened 
employment levels.  
As a way to counterbalance competitive pressures from imported equipments, the competitive challenges 
most corporations of this industrial group are facing is related to expanding assembly capacity and export 
performance and accessing foreign technology while increasing local innovation capabilities. 
 
7.2.1. Mechanical equipment 
The mechanical engineering industries were affected by the low levels of investment prevailing in the 
country, and trade liberalisation that significantly reduced non-tariff barriers and other duties related to the 
imports of capital goods. These conditions have clearly restricted the domestic market for mechanical 
goods made in Brazil, favouring imports.  
While apparent consumption decreased from US$17.2 in 1990 to US$14.4 billion in 2000, imports 
increased and local production local decreased substantially. Exports and import coefficients remained 
relatively stable, after 1995. (Table 36)  
 
TABLE 36 
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT: PRODUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE -1980-2000 (US$ BILLION) 
Year Production Exports Imports Trade balance 
Apparent 
consumption 
Export 
coefficient % 
Import 
coefficient % 
1990 16.7 2.6 3.2 -0.5 17.2 15.9 18.5 
1995 14.3 3.8 6.9 -3.1 17.4 26.6 39.8 
1996 12.4 3.8 7.4 -3.6 16.0 31.2 46.6 
1997 12.3 4.1 9.6 -5.4 17.7 33.9 54.2 
1998 11.5 3.9 8.8 -4.8 16.4 34.0 53.6 
1999 10.2 3.4 7.3 -3.8 14.1 33.3 51.7 
2000 11.5 3.5 6.4 -2.9 14.4 30.5 44.7 
Source: Vermulm and Erber (2002) 
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Facing hardship, firms implemented an important restructuring process. As shown in  
Table 37, between 1990 and 2000, employment levels were cut by 50%. 
 
TABLE 37 
CAPITAL GOODS: SALES PER EMPLOYEES (R$ 2000) AND ANNUAL AVERAGE TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
1990/2000 
Year Revenue/employee Employment (1,000) 
1990 92.4 331.9 
1995 119.9 218.2 
2000 131.6 160.2 
Source: Vermulm and Erber (2002) 
 
To sustain restructuring company level efforts focused on the introduction of new managerial methods to 
ensure efficiency of production processes and the reduction and specialisation of product portfolio. The 
results of implementing new methods of productive organisation were important. Through the adoption of 
just in time methods and subcontracting some activities, the mechanical engineering sector was able to 
improve efficiency and maintain minimum levels of production, without corresponding increases in 
expenses on the purchase of new machinery.  
The competitiveness of Brazilian mechanical engineering capital goods is higher in product lines of low 
and medium technological intensity, where product cycles have matured. Price competitiveness is decisive 
and company advantages lie on privileged access to low cost inputs and labour costs. Brazilian industry 
also occupies certain niches where equipments are technically more sophisticated, requiring strong 
interactions between suppliers and clients, especially if local and regional demand is economically relevant 
and relatively high. 
However, some of the structural features of this industry, especially in relation to the division of labour 
between local and foreign producers have not changed. On the contrary, past trends were reinforced: 
locally owned companies tend to participate in the low technology segments while foreign companies 
produce more sophisticated capital goods. Concentration levels are lower than the manufacturing 
industry’s average; in 1997 the four largest corporations shared 18% of the sector’s revenue, compared to 
an average of 30% in the manufacturing industry. 
These features indicate that companies that have managed to survive the hardships of the 1990s are, 
probably, in better competitive shape than before; they are leaner in terms of production processes and 
product portfolio; most probably there has been an increase in specialisation levels which may constitute 
the basis upon which to grow in the years to come. Even so, most of the competitive challenges of the early 
1990s remain, especially those related to a weak technological base. 
 
7.2.2. Telequipment industry 
The scenario in the telecommunications equipments sector is very different from the mechanical 
engineering sector, due to the high intensity of technical progress in the industry and its close relationship 
with the Brazilian privatisation process, undertaken in the second half of the 1990s. A recent estimate by 
Oliva (2002) indicates that, under strict rules of concession, that imposed investment targets, expenditures 
by privatised companies amounted to US$ 20 billion, between 1998 and 2000. 
As a result, as shown in Table 38, sales revenue in 2000 were 124% higher than the 1995 level. These 
figures indicate that, most probable, the growth of the local market was sufficient to attract new assembly 
units to Brazil. It is important to take into account that being an assembly operation, it is likely that these 
new production units relied on global sourcing to ensure delivery times to clients. That is the reason behind 
the constant trade deficit of the industry that reached, in 2001, US$ 2 billion, with U$ 3.5 billion of imports 
(43% from the ALCA region, 26% from UE) and US$1.5 billion of exports (90% to the ALCA region).  
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TABLE 38 
TELEQUIPMENT INDUSTRY SALES, 1995-2000 (US$ MILLION) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 D 
2000/1995 
Sales 2,442 3,553 5,107 4,698 4,044 5,471 124% 
Annual rate of growth 16% 45% 44% -8% -14% 35% - 
Source: Oliva (2002) 
 
Even so, to a great extent the sharp increase in demand could be supplied from local sources because of its 
previous consolidated existence in the country; most of the major international players were already 
established in the country and some local firms were equally active.  
But the expansion of demand brought into the country new foreign firms that acquired locally owned ones. 
Out of the 10 largest international producers, only two do not have production plants in Brazil. As a result 
of this situation, the domestic market of telecom equipments has faced an intense process of inward 
internationalisation. According to Oliva (2002), of the 42 main firms operating in this market in 2000, 26 
were foreign firms. As shown in Table 39, out of a total revenue of US$ 8.8 billion, the share of foreign 
owned corporations amounted to 91.3%. 
TABLE 39 
THE MARKET SHARE OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN 2000 
Controlling capital Sales (US$ million) Market share 
Foreign 8,054.2 91,3% 
Local 762.9 8,7% 
Total 8,817.1 100% 
Source: Oliva (2002) 
 
More important, locally owned firms are, in general, of medium size, supplying simple and standardised 
inputs and components to major international telequipment producers. These foreign firms relied on the 
strategy of combining local production expansion and imports of components to be locally assembled. This 
has decisively influenced the trade-flow scenario. Indeed, sectoral growth can be largely attributed to the 
expansion of imports. Thus, although the industry has expanded production capacity, there are still very 
clear deficiencies concerning the lack of supply capacity of components. 
As in the past, for the years to come, the evolution of the industry will depend on investments carried on in 
the country’s telecommunication infrastructure. Since 2001 as investments slowed down supply firms 
contracted production just as fast as capacity was expanded.  
 
7.2.3. Computer industry 
The computer sector has been expanding steadily in the country but, contrary to the national ownership 
oriented regime of incentives and regulation of the 1980s, during the 1990s barriers to foreign firms and to 
imports were not relevant. Thus framework conditions changed and this had a direct impact on 
performance and market structures. 
The most important change was the increasing market dominance of foreign firms. From 1996 to 2000, the 
share of sales of foreign firms on total sectoral sales increased from 48% to 66%. Among the largest 15 
firms in the sector, only one, Itautec, is controlled by local capital. Another change was the increasing role 
of larger firms, relatively to small and medium size ones. As Table 40 shows, SMEs were responsible for 
17.1% of sales revenue in 1996; in 1998 sales from SMEs reached 21.1% but, in 2000, their share  had 
receded to only 5.2%.  
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TABLE 40 
SALES REVENUE OF HARDWARE, SERVICES AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 US$  US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ % 
Hardware 8.821 53.1 10.654 49.4 14.976 55.7 13.709 53.9 16.310 53.4 
Software 1.327 8.0 1.928 8.9 2.361 8.8 2.160 8.5 2.527 8.3 
Services 6.453 38.9 8.969 41.6 9.546 35.5 9.564 37.6 11.721 38.4 
Total  16.602 100 21.552 100 26.884 100 25.434 100 30.558 100 
Total SMEs 2.838 17.1 3.375 15.7 5.665 21.1 2.929 11.5 1.591 5.2 
Source: Porto (2002) 
Table 40 also shows that, the relative importance among various industrial segments has not changed; sales 
from hardware producers still predominate in this industry, with at least 50% of total share, followed by 
service suppliers, with an average of 38% of total sales, during the second half of the 1990s. 
Table 41 below indicates an important expansion of the industry (computers and components), departing 
from US$ 6 billion in 1990 to reach US$ 10.7 billion in 1998. Since then growth has slowed down. These 
figures also indicate that the computer industry has managed to outgrow component production. This, to a 
large extent, is the increasing reliance of this industry on imported inputs. 
TABLE 41 
REVENUE SALES IN THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER INDUSTRY - 1990/2001  (US$ MILLION) 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 
A) Computers 3,719 4,169 5,274 7,407 8,311 7,047 5,892 
B) Components 2,336 1,361 2,179 2,783 2,456 2,587 2,105 
A/B 1.59 3.06 2.42 2.66 3.38 2.72 2.80 
Source: Porto (2002) 
Indeed, when contrasting imports of components and imports of final computer goods (Table 42), there is a 
clear disparity: from 1997 to 2001 the average annual value of components imports equalled US$5.1 
billion, while the average annual value of computer goods imports amounted to US$1.02 billion. More 
important, when computer sales decreased, after 2000, and  the Real was devalued -after 1999-, computer 
imports remained relatively stable but imports of electronic components remained substantial. 
TABLE 42 
COMPUTER INDUSTRY, IMPORT/EXPORTS 1997/2001, US$ MILLION 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Exports (1+2) 1,331 1,458 1,587 1,865 1,809 
1- Computer 255 235 323 346 251 
2- Components 1,076 1,223 1,264 1,519 1,558 
    of which, components for computers 91 124 151 144 146 
      
Imports (3+4) 6,406 5,840 5,874 7,690 6,793 
3- Computer 1,232 1,090 855 1,080 1,032 
4- Components 5,174 4,750 4,839 6,610 5,761 
    of which, components for computers 562 671 665 856 782 
      
Trade Balance 5,075 4,382 4,287 5,825 4,984 
Source: Porto (2002) 
Computer producers also went through major adjustment in their production processes. Following a well 
established pattern in other industries, computer firms initially outsourced administrative activities, 
followed by the introduction of new organisational techniques that implied lower employment levels. New 
methods of labour organisation and reengineering process resulted In a sharp reduction of employment 
levels. As shown in Figure 11, employment expanded between 1984 and 1989. Since then and until 1999 
the total number of employees was cut by 48,1%. 
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FIGURE 11 
EMPLOYMENT LEVELS AMONG THE LARGEST 50 MANUFACTURERS OF INFORMATION 
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Source Porto (2002) 
 
8. MADE IN BRAZIL 10 YEARS LATER. AND AFTER? 
Between 1990 and 2002 the Brazilian economy went through a process of radical institutional change, 
towards economic liberalisation. During the same period, the economy accumulated low rates of growth, 
with frequent annual oscillations. Internationally, the diffusion of information technologies was very 
expressive and a wave of mergers and acquisitions swept the planet. 
These are not minor processes, having induced, in other industrialising Latin American countries, major 
structural changes, but with very specific national idiosyncrasies. Within the NAFTA context, Mexico 
became a specialised supplier (of low labour costs) to the US as it entered into and sustained very high 
rates of growth in assembling electronic goods. Chile modified its industrial matrix, shifting towards 
exploiting and transforming its natural resource base, generating products for exports, supported by 
sophisticated logistics. Argentina found and lost direction; for some time it seemed that the country would 
constitute an important industrial base for the Mercosur market. But, after the Brazilian devaluation and 
the break up of the Argentinean convertibility plan, relatively to its past, an economically significant 
portion of its industrial activities became idle or was dismantled. 
In Brazil, the most striking feature of the period was the lack of structural transformation. That is, 
international changes and, in the local front, economic liberalisation and low but oscillating growth did not 
induce shifts in the specific trajectory the Brazilian industry was already evolving along, since the late 
1980s. Then, modernisation and inward internationalisation were emerging processes, high in the agenda 
of leading firms, in most industrial groups. Along the years these two processes were accentuated, 
assuming economically significant proportions.  
Were external changes not sufficient for changing the industry’s trajectory? Or, alternatively, has the 
accumulated size and competences and the complexity of Brazilian industry been so high that previous 
trajectory would not have changed, regardless the size of exogenous shocks? These are questions with no 
possible answer. It is more reasonable to proceed to a careful balance of industrial production Made in 
Brazil, 10 years after our early, but thorough investigation on the perspectives of competitiveness, in order 
to examine the extent of evolution and change. By doing that, it may be possible to draw out perspectives 
for the years to come. 
The lack of structural change can be confirmed by simple but strong evidence. The most important is: 
during this period, very few genuinely new economic activities were added to the country’s industrial 
matrix. Similarly, very few previously existing activities ceased to exist. More important for industrial 
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progress is the fact that, between 1990 and 2002, only in very few sectors a set of firms responsible for 
most part of production were engaged in investments directed towards capacity expansion. Substantive 
investment only occurred in steel, automotive, consumer electronics and telequipment. These are good 
examples of reactions to a combined phenomenon of positive perception on demand expansion together 
with pro-active response to competition. These examples may be useful in indicating a potential vitality, 
pro-growth, in the Brazilian industry. 
Competitive industrial activities – where competent firms represent a large proportion of production- 
remain so, essentially those associated with the commodity group. Weak competences still prevail among 
activities associated with innovation carriers, although firms demonstrated ability to deliver equipment 
where demand expanded –telequiment-. Heterogeneity is still an important feature of traditional industries, 
even though responsiveness has increased, alongside with the formation of local clusters of productive 
systems. As an industrial group, perhaps, changes were more pronounced in durable industries, through 
expansionist investments and increasing rates of product differentiation. 
Imports and exports increased along the years, but they are originated from expected industrial segments: 
inwards, electronic components and chemical inputs are still a burden on the country’s international trade; 
outwards, the commodity industrial group still generates most of the country’s foreign exchange. Of course 
these exports should be further expanded, alongside with others that should have higher income elasticity. 
Indeed, new exports, from high technological opportunities, have taken roots. The aircraft industry is the 
outstanding example. On the same token, imports of electronics and chemicals are very important to the 
modernisation of the Brazilian industry. But, certainly, the size of their trade deficit induce serious 
thoughts on how to internalise production, at least in some segments of these industries. 
As mentioned above, from an economic perspective, the most significant active processes were the 
continuation of modernisation and ownership change. In the early 1990s, there were already signs of 
modernisation and inward internationalisation, especially among leading firms, in most industrial groups. 
Between 1990 and 2002, modernisation provided the technical basis upon which firms could sustain 
competitive pressure from imports. Inward internationalisation reached levels that imposed changes to 
market structures, in segments where firms controlling a large proportion of sales change ownership, in a 
short span of time. 
Modernisation was a process in play in very economic activity in the country, reaching organisations, 
production processes, products and suppliers. Supported by a wide diffusion of labour saving techniques 
and without sustained growth in demand levels, the negative impact of modernisation on employment was 
extremely high. Between 1990 and 2002, in most industrial activities, at least 30% of the labour force was 
dismissed. Thousands of work places simply disappeared or were outsourced.  
But, as a result, surviving firms became more efficient and capable of sustaining competitive pressures 
from imports and from newcomers to local production. More interestingly though, the recent process of 
change has not induced modifications in the relative position among different firms. Those that were 
relatively stronger in the period pre-crisis have shown better adaptive capacity and vice-versa. In other 
words, the relative position of players –in terms of size, origin of capital, sector and location of 
corporations- did not change. Large firms, from commodity or durable industrial groups, located in the 
southern part of the country not only actively engaged in the process of modernisation and inward 
internationalisation but , more important, they have increased their relative distance from those situated 
down below the competitive ladder. 
Mergers and acquisitions changed the ownership landscape of Brazilian industry, reinforcing the role of 
foreign capital in it. As a result the Brazilian economy is now even more internationalised than before even 
though this is a long term and structural feature of the country. However, the country may face a 
development paradox in the years to come. History tell us that local capital and local innovation 
capabilities have been outstanding features of countries successful in sustaining economic and social 
development. If ownership internationalisation is to remain and local innovation capabilities must be 
pursued, then Brazilian private and public policy makers are facing challenges associated with how to 
attract investments of this nature. To a great extent, this will mean an important departure from established 
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policy practices, to new ways of regulating and inducing firms towards local value creation.   
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